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UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT

JOHN DEWEY

A SPECIAL ISSUE ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 90th BIRTHDAY

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REPORT FROM PITTSBURGH

By JACK WEEKS

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

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New Republic

CONTENTS FOR OCT. 17, 1949

5 The Enemies of Leland Olds: An Editorial

6 The Week:

6 Down Payment on Security

6 Hero Without a Cause

7 Report from Pittsburgh, by Jack Weeks

9 Harold L. Ickes

SPECIAL SECTION ON JOHN DEWEY

10 Introduction

11 Dewey and His Times, by Ralph Barton Perry

15 Education, by Boyd H. Bode

18 Economics, by C. E. Ayres

20 Science, by Ernest Nagel

23 Psychology, by Gordon W. Allport

26 Literature, by George Boas

29 Metaphysics, by Wilmon H. Sheldon

32 Ethics, by Y. H. Krikorian

36 Art, by Irwin Edman

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WASHINGTON WIRE

AT ONE TIME last week Senate Majority Leader Lucas thought Congress might quit by this Saturday (October 15). Generally if you take Lucas' optimistic forecasts and triple them you are about right, but anyway the 81st Congress is almost ready to stop work till next January. That means that soon all of us Washington reporters will have to sit down and write thoughtful pieces about whether the session was a boon or a bust.

In the nature of things little Harry Truman has to praise this session because it is his Congress. The funny thing is that in a large sense he's right. It's done a lot. It's been one of the most singular sessions in history. It's lasted into the tenth month. Practically the whole time headlines have proclaimed Truman "defeats." A well-defined mental stereotype has emerged of a balky Congress kicking out Administration projects. In one sense that's true. Truman would ask Congress for about 120 percent more than he expected. Congress, with a great show of indignation, would slash it down to 75 percent. Truman would smile his little-man smile and bounce back with something else. It's a funny way to run a country. It's not the Roosevelt way. But at the close of the session there the score is. It's been creeping up. It's impressive.

We personally are interested in the human side of this odd drama. Truman's Congressional opponents are just as determined to underestimate him and the forces behind him now as they were one year ago when (you remember) Dewey was going to win the election. They just can't take the man seriously. He's a good-natured, insignificant little second-rater—well-meaning enough, sure—but quite incompetent. Be alarmed by Truman? It's congenitally impossible; besides, he's only a political accident. And so Truman gets through Congress an astonishing total of acts on the international side and an impressive list of domestic legislation, winding up with a prospective extension of social security to 11 million people. (Truman asked extension to 20 million, so that's another "defeat.")

The most surprising manifestation is the way Congress toiled right through the jungle-hot Washington summer. If FDR had asked such a sacrifice he would have been called "tyrant" and "dictator." Congressional opponents looked at Truman and sighed wearily. Does a little man with a falsetto voice who wears a bow tie, double-breasted suits and neatly folded four-prong breast-pocket hankjes look like a "dictator"? No, reserve that word for sinister Harvard figures with up-tilted cigarette holders! Besides, to call Truman a "dictator" inferentially acknowledges a degree of force, character and ability which opponents would rather die than concede.

The Navy, like a spoiled child, is crying its heart out that it's "misunderstood" in a great House committee hearing of kleig lights, gold braid and crystal chandeliers. Starting with the unpardonable Cedric Worth smear of civilian officials, the Navy clique followed with Captain Crommelin's opera-bouffe disclosure of confidential documents to a surprised AP reporter. Navy Secretary Matthews, scrappy Omaha lawyer, has a mutiny on his hands.

The sincerity of the rebellious admirals, nevertheless, can't be denied. And the fact is that Soviet attainment of the atom bomb makes it necessary to revalue all US weapons and strategy. Von Clausewitz's famous dictum that war is merely an extension of national policy seems pretty silly when

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atomic war means annihilation for both sides. And the B-36 is based on the mass-bombing concept. It is something to ponder.

A lot is going on in international affairs. All the US envoys to the Iron Curtain countries meet in London October 24 and 25 at a specially hush-hush conference with Assistant Secretary of State George Perkins to get the new signals. This may be connected with the developing Soviet drive on Yugoslavia, which is serious. What Russia seems to be planning is to ring Tito with a series of guerrilla invasions based just over the boundary. Nominally they would be led by Yugoslav exiles, but actually they would be financed by Moscow. Can Yugoslavia be turned into another Greece on the military side? There are some who think so.

Notes. The big effort has started to lead our part of Germany back into polite society; Britain and France look on dubiously while we take the initiative. . . . Senators who passionately deplore the "welfare state" and extol "free enterprise" vote the next moment for thumping big farm-support subsidies to keep up prices—an unconscious inconsistency that is one of the hardest things for foreigners to understand. . . . It seems unlikely that the 81st Congress at any time will boost taxes enough to balance the budget; we have a hunch people will be talking about "inflation" again this time next year.

The danger is that a defeat of Leland Olds will tend to cow all other federal commissioners whose importance as policeman over industry few citizens understand. . . . The new UK Inland Revenue Blue Book shows only 70 people left in Britain earning $30,000 a year after income taxes. . . . Congressmen shouldn't try cases for fees in federal courts; Representative Chudoff (D, Pa.) tried it and was slapped down by District Court Judge McGranery. The appeal on this case involves the whole legislative-judicial relationship.

Washington T. R. B.

CORRESPONDENCE

Ezra Pound, Continued

SIR: Malcolm Cowley, in "The Battle Over Ezra Pound" (the *NR*, October 3), says that *The Pisan Cantos* is the weakest of Pound's books, the most crotchety and maundering; and that it was the worst of several possible choices among the books of poems published in 1948. Of the Fellows, who nevertheless chose it by a vote of eleven to one, Mr. Cowley, with one exception, speaks very highly "as men and writers." Presumably, then, these Fellows are as able judges of good poetry as Mr. Cowley. Why then did they so radically differ with Mr. Cowley and with such startling near-unanimity? . . .

All circumlocutions and refinements aside, what is a plain man like myself to think of Fellows who award a prize to a "guaranteed-to-be-crazy" Fascist for "a disordered book of disordered observations, an old man's mutterings"? That they are either bad judges of poetry or had some other axe to grind. Mr. Cowley assures us that they are not bad judges of poetry.

New York City DAVID L. WEISSMAN

SIR: I think Malcolm Cowley's general estimate of Pound is the last word. It is exactly how I feel about Pound. . . .

Where he and I differ somewhat is on his estimate of Robert Hillyer, which is pretty severe. I think the whole big mistake was in having a committee sponsored by the Library of Congress, which *is* a public institution, make an award like that. That was what made Hillyer see red. On the other hand he is apt to let his feelings carry him into very careless statements. His remarks on Jung were a case in point. My friend Leonard Bacon, who knows a great deal about Jung, found that attitude toward Jung quite untenable.

I know and admire very much some of the people who made the award to Pound, and I do not think Eliot did anything underhanded about the award. I do not think he exerted pressure. In fact I think he'd lean over backward to do the opposite. But he and Pound have been closely associated for years in the past. They are very old friends. I think others of the committee were probably swayed by a certain amount of emotion. I really can't imagine why they thought *The Pisan Cantos* so superior. . . .

I agree that the controversy has given Pound far too much publicity and has given a loose rein to a lot of people who really hate poetry and want to prove that all poets are scum. But any controversy on poetry brings out those muckers.

There is another thing. I don't think Cowley realizes how, to some of us who practise a more traditional art, the criticism of poetry has lately seemed to be entirely controlled by the hyper-intellectual. Or almost entirely, in the higher regions. It has furnished me some amusement, the way these haughty and supercilious creatures have created a jargon of criticism. It is of no particular importance I suppose, and it certainly doesn't apply to Cowley himself, who has a lot of sense. But the cliques are there; and the boys with the shibboleth. I am an Ephraimite!

New York City WILLIAM ROSE BENET

Union with Britain?

SIR: In the "Federation with Britain?" discussion in the September 19 issue, the dilemma was raised but its horns were not grasped. In the Anglo-US situation it ought to be clear that we are economic competitors and political conspirators. Britain's value in the latter role is dependent on its health in the former field. But improvement toward stability and security in British industry and finance is a direct threat to our present ascendency therein. So, we must keep them strong to aid us in our political competition with the Soviet Union and weak to protect our foreign *and* domestic assets in industries and markets.

This dilemma, sometimes claimed as a discovery of Karl Marx's, is elemental in all studies of human conduct in society. It deals with the production of values and the distribution and protection of values: economy (industry and fiscal processes) being the analogue of production of values, and politics being that of distribution and protection of values. History demonstrates that when they are artificially separated, aggravating imbalances occur in the distribution and protection of values which lead to social unrest, revolution and war. . . .

Possibilities of the situation? However repugnant it might be politically for the British to be forced into close economic coöperation with Russia within the next few years, reluctance on our part to be realistic now may lead to just that. Is anything further needed to demonstrate —especially in the Anglo-US case—the integral nature of politics and economy? The first step in grasping the horns of the dilemma is the admission of this fact in our thinking and actions.

I dare say Mr. Norman Thomas would like to take over here.

New York City GEORGE G. ABERNATHY

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VOLUME 121, NUMBER 16, ISSUE 1820, NEW YORK CITY, OCTOBER 17, 1949 **New Republic**

THE ENEMIES OF LELAND OLDS

FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT maintained that when industry became bigger than government, democracy would perish in America.

The danger is always present. The efforts of government to defend the supremacy of the general welfare by regulation of monopoly tend always to be self-defeating. The regulatory agencies created during reform waves soon pass into industry's hands, giving legal sanction to whatever the monopolies wish to do.

The railroads have long dominated the Interstate Commerce Commission, the monopolies the Federal Trade Commission, the airlines the Civil Aeronautics Board. The Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Communications Commission are in retreat. Now the Federal Power Commission is about to be captured by the utility and gas interests. They are driving from the Commission its central force and will, Leland Olds.

Olds, shouts the Senate committee, shaking the yellowed pages of newspapers 20 years old, is the glib salesman of a foreign ideology. Who, then, are the Americans? Olds is the product of New England's Protestant conscience, of social work in Boston slums and of Pennsylvania steel strikes, of Frank Walsh and Franklin Roosevelt. He wrote radically because, as he explained to his Senate inquisitors, "I believed radical writing was needed in the golden twenties to shock the American people, and particularly labor, out of their social and political lethargy."

But his real radicalism is that, unlike the respectable men who use government as a quick promotion to the vice-presidencies of the monopolies they were commissioned to curb, Olds believes in using government for the public welfare. His real crime is that as a Federal Power Commissioner he sweated $1.3 billion out of inflated utility values and slashed gas and electricity rates by $45 million a year. His real crime is that he is an irreplaceable guardian of the public interest over the richest and easiest area of public exploitation in America.

Until now the FPC has been bigger than the utilities industry by a vote of three to two. Tender toward industry are Nelson Smith and Harrington Wimberly, the campaign manager and protégé of Senator Robert Kerr, the natural-gas millionaire. Behind Olds have stood Thomas Buchanan and Claude Draper. With Olds replaced by an industry man, the fight will be over.

In the drumhead court martial of Olds by the Senate committee, only the Senators who supported the Kerr bill were allowed to sit in judgment on its chief opponent. Of the 16 witnesses they drummed up to testify against Olds, 10 were from Texas. All were appearing for oil interests.

Now the most powerful forces that convene on Capitol Hill are massed against Olds. Against him are the gas lobby, the utilities lobby, the tidelands lobby, which believes that once the grab for natural gas is here, the grab for tidelands oil cannot be far behind. Against him are the New York banks such as Dillon, Read, which profiteered from the sales of the Big Inch and Little Inch pipelines. Against him are the Southwest Democrats, the Republican Party, and the Senator from his own state, John Foster Dulles, partner in Sullivan and Cromwell and counsel for the great utilities.

Against Olds is a onetime liberal Senator, Lyndon Johnson, born into the family of a poor farmer, brought forward by the New Deal, and carried into office by liberal and labor support. Johnson, who saw his first backer, Aubrey Williams, hounded out of government on charges of Communism, now is hounding Olds out on the same charges—Johnson, who boasted that Roosevelt was a "Daddy to me." How Roosevelt would have scorned such backsliding!

The capitulation of the Senate before these interests, the punishment of a man who has served the people, by the people's elected representatives, compel again the question whether the marriage of democracy and monopoly capitalism can last, and whether integrity can thrive in a society dedicated to making money. These are major questions. No double talk, no antique charges against Olds, raised and discarded many times before, can conceal them. The Senate vote on Leland Olds is a vote on the right of monopoly to public plunder, and the public will record the vote with a memory long and clear and unrelenting.

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THE WEEK

FACULTY LOYALTY

The faculty of the University of California has turned a cold shoulder on cold-war hysteria. At a recent meeting at Berkeley, some 700 members of the faculty adopted a resolution calling upon the Board of Regents to rescind a loyalty-oath requirement handed them when school opened this fall. They stated clearly that they favored the Constitution of the United States and that of California, but they did object to taking an oath which implies that they are all disloyal until they sign it. They were required to swear, "I am not a member of the Communist Party, or under any oath, or a party to any agreement, or under any commitment that is in conflict with my obligations under this oath."

The California faculty is not alone in its efforts to maintain the principle of tenure and academic freedom. The presidents of the University of Chicago and Yale have declared that they would impose no loyalty oaths on members of their faculties.

DOWN PAYMENT ON SECURITY

In his mid-year economic report, President Truman called attention to the "pools of heavy unemployment" which have developed recently and emphasized that they "need to be treated before they spread." Since then, the President has moved to do something about these new critical areas. Presidential Assistant John Steelman is in charge of coördinating the planning of federal programs.

The Senate has passed the basic measure—a $100 million appropriation to encourage states "to maintain an adequate reserve of fully planned public works readily available in order that construction may be started promptly, when economic conditions should make such action desirable." The funds will be allocated for a two-year period by Administrator Jess Larson, who estimates that the $100 million bill would make possible about $3 billion worth of advance planning. All projects would need to conform to an over-all public-works plan. The federal government would be authorized to apportion 25 percent of the funds to any area which seemed most in need of immediate assistance, regardless of population.

The postponement of public-works activities during the war has accumulated a large need for construction of local public buildings and other community facilities. "This huge accumulation of needs," the Senate Public Works Committee report stated, "could be used at any time in the future as a cushion against declining economic activity." The bill passed the Senate by voice vote. The House last week finished the job, passing the bill by a vote of 209 to 69.

HERO WITHOUT A CAUSE

When Admiral Radford, Admiral Bogan and Captain Crommelin maintain that the morale of the Navy has been broken by unification, they are referring largely to their own morale. And yet to most of us the idea that a four-billion-a-year service is being nibbled to death is a little ridiculous.

These leaders of naval aviation are the same men who testified against unification in 1947. They argued then that if the Air Force should be established as an independent body, Naval Aviation should join it. This infuriated the surface Navy, and since then the air admirals have smarted under the battleship admirals just as the battleship admirals have smarted under the Ground Force and Air Force generals.

The naval aviators claimed that $200 million was better spent on a super carrier than on a B-36 bomber wing. Secretary Johnson disagreed. The forum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was provided precisely for these battles; instead, the naval aviators carried them to the press. An easy-going Chief of Naval Operations and a completely inexperienced Secretary of the Navy allowed their insubordination to reach intolerable levels.

Now Crommelin has forced his own court martial. A number of old free-wheelers like Bull Halsey, and all of Secretary Johnson's many ill-wishers, are likely to support him. Crommelin has all the courage of Billy Mitchell, though little of Billy's good sense. He is fighting progress, a hero without a cause. The real Mitchells of today are not the Crommelins but the Forrest Shermans, exiled by Navy brass for too warm support of unification.

PHONES FOR FARMERS

Congress has passed a bill curbing the American Bell Telephone Company's monopoly which has deprived millions of rural homes of telephones in this age of farm mechanization. Introduced jointly by Representative W. R. Poage (D, Tex.) and Senator Lister Hill (D, Ala.), the measure authorizes the Rural Electrification Administration to make loans to finance expanded telephone service in rural areas. The bill, strongly opposed by the AT&T (now involved in an anti-trust suit filed by the Department of Justice early this year), passed the Senate by voice vote last week. The House had approved the measure July 13, by 282 to 109.

Over the years, AT&T discovered that farm systems were extremely unprofitable. The old farmer-owned mutual systems gradually deteriorated and the number of rural telephones dropped from 2.5 million in 1920 to 1.5 million in 1940. Today only about 40 percent of the homes in rural communities enjoy telephone service, while more than 72 percent have electric power as a result of the establishment of the REA.

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REPORT FROM PITTSBURGH

by Jack Weeks

ONCE AGAIN the steel workers are carrying the burden for their brothers in organized labor, and indeed for that great majority of Americans who cannot count on a secure old age. Once more in Homestead, Youngstown and Gary the men who make the basic ingredient of American prosperity are sitting at home in unaccustomed idleness, loafing on the dreary corners of their dreadful towns or drinking somberly in sordid bars, while their anxious wives try to make ends meet out of the last pay check and plan the skimpy meals that can be bought out of strike benefits.

A strike is never much fun for anybody except those who see in every such struggle an improvement over the old order. This strike is even more to be deplored than most, since the sacrifice of the steel workers seems so unnecessary. It would appear that after the lessons and examples of the recent past we ought to have a better way of achieving the objective of assured subsistence for men who have lived to be 65 and have not been able to lay away enough to feed themselves on the rest of the journey.

With the furnaces going full blast, the atmosphere of a town like Pittsburgh is scarcely gay. With the plants shut down by the more usual form of labor dispute—a rough, tough brawl over wages and working conditions—it is not a jolly place either. But in this particular strike there seems to be a mood of even deeper depression than is common to these smoggy settlements. The attitude of both sides suggests that this strike ought never to have been called.

The embarrassment of the union is suggested by the picketing technique and the lack of the religious fervor to be expected in a struggle directly involving half a million workers at the moment and threatening to drag in another half-million. The first thing you notice coming into Pittsburgh is that the mills *are* idle—only the wispiest of smoke climbs from the factory chimneys to the perpetual overcast above the brown mountains. The next thing you see is that the streets fronting the plants are deserted. There are no mass picket lines, no sound trucks, no rolling kitchens, no earnest bands of singers chanting "We Shall Not Be Moved."

There are many gates where pickets are not to be seen at all. The union assures the visitor that it has pickets on every gate in the district, that "the boys are probably just inside a shack keeping warm," but it isn't cold enough for that and such is the genteel nature of the conflict at this writing that it would not be surprising if the union had decided on merely token picketing. (There are some gates around the Jones & Laughlin mill where the only pickets seem to be inanimate, the pickets' duty apparently being performed entirely by placards tacked to telephone poles.)

At the Homestead-Braddock district headquarters only two union officers were on hand and they did not seem unduly excited or overworked. The usual troubles of a strike leader had hardly started. The phone rang once during the writer's visit and the man in the office made it short and sweet. "Listen," he said, "tell them they don't need any God damned relief yet. They still got a pay comin'." Within sight of the battleground where 11 workers and seven Pinkertons died 57 years ago in another struggle over principle, the district officers went about their work as undramatically as a pair of insurance agents. The only indication that passions might be aroused in this controversy and that it could follow the traditional course of violence was in the presence of a Pennsylvania state policeman who stood in front of the building housing the union office, chewing a large cigar and making a face like a man looking for trouble.

At the offices of the big locals things were not very different. Tempers were even, nothing much out of the daily routine was in evidence. Pickets came in off their shifts in groups of no more than four and five. In the back rooms of the local halls a few of the older men, the ones for whom the big issue of the strike is of immediate importance, hung around, hoping to make themselves useful. So far they were being spared the onerous chore of picket duty; later, maybe, they would be used in mass picketing to dramatize the undramatic point under dispute.

At the downtown offices of the United Steelworkers of America International and in the Pittsburgh headquarters of the United States Steel Corporation the scene was substantially the same. Phil Murray sat tight. Benjamin Fairless sat tight. Their spokesmen prepared temperate little statements of position and took pains to



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see that nobody said or did anything that might start something.

In the polite war of words the union people had the better of it.

The companies piously declared that they were in favor of social security and would be happy to abide by the Presidential Fact-Finding Board's recommendation on pensions except for one thing: the companies felt that the workers should themselves contribute to the pension fund. The companies could not, in good conscience, allow the sturdy American character of their employees to be demoralized by the vicious paternalism of being pensioned out of money to which they had not contributed their mite. You were led to believe that in this matter the management of an industry which made profits of $623,900,000 last year was above any such crass considerations as money, that it was motivated entirely by a desire to save souls.

"Look at it this way," said a well-nourished spokesman for Big Steel, looking at it from the vantage point of an office about the size of a billiard parlor and much better furnished. "We believe that an employee is a better employee if he has a stake in the community. We think he ought to own his own home, for instance. In the same way we think he ought to participate in any plan for security in his old age."

Looking at it that way, it was hard to see how an employee would be much improved by owning the kind of dwelling that passes for adequate in towns like Homestead, Braddock and Munhall, but the argument might have been persuasive if the union had not pointed out a certain inconsistency in the companies' position. Under the title of "The Truth," the union published a leaflet setting forth that the management seems to have no strong moral objection to paying non-participating pensions to itself. From the CIO statement it appears that at the age of 65 Benjamin Fairless, for example, will draw a pension of $50,000 paid for by the company, in addition to a $26,537 pension, of which the company pays for part. His own contribution to the $26,537 sum amounts to $5,910, according to the union, which he must somehow piece together out of an annual salary of $207,900.

In the same pamphlet the union cited other juicy examples of the industry's deplorable willingness to destroy the incentive in what might be called its high-level employees. It observed that the memorable T. M. Girdler, chairman of Republic Steel, is listed for a pension of $50,000 a year and that "the record seems to indicate" that Girdler makes no contribution to it out of a salary reported to have been $275,000 last year.

It would be interesting to know what the pension situation is in the homes of 10 other employees of Republic who were killed and 90 who were wounded at South Chicago during the 1937 strike.

The injustices that have characterized the steel industry's labor policy the past year and the union's rather convincing rebuttal of the companies' argument about non-participating pension plans don't have too much to do with the case, however. The situation in Pittsburgh conveys the impression that Benjamin Fairless has got Phil Murray in a box. In agreeing to "proceed now to negotiate with any and all companies and to conclude a prompt settlement on the basis of the [Fact-Finding] Board's recommendations," Murray has appeared to concede that the real issue is the question of non-participating pensions, since that is what the question was boiled down to in the Board's report.

It seems reasonable to suppose that for most of his membership the pension matter is *not* the only serious question, that for many of the young men it is really not much of an issue at all. Only two percent of the United Steelworkers are eligible to benefit from a pension plan in the near future. How long will the other 98 percent hang on for the sake of the minority and for benefits that they may never receive?

The feeling is inescapable that US Steel is not unaware of this and may be in no hurry to settle the matter. It is also likely that the industry is counting on a certain lack of public sympathy for the strike, despite the fact that a public board expressed the opinion that management ought to pay the bill for old-age security. The companies assume that there is bound to be some indifference toward workers whose pay is at least as good as the national average and who appear to the public to be saying, in effect, that they won't chip in a cent toward their own future, especially when most of the rest of the population is either paying a share of its security bill or has no protection at all. The companies doubtless hope that, as time goes on and the damage to the national welfare occasioned by the strike and/or lockout grows more destructive, this feeling of indifference will turn to positive resentment. The union's position cannot be universally popular. But the industry can scarcely claim the right to educate its employees in the lessons of thrift and self-reliance at such a high price to the rest of us.

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HAROLD L. ICKES: *Conquest or Suicide?*

A GREAT AMERICAN, Archibald MacLeish, wrote an article for the July *Atlantic Monthly* that should be thoughtfully read. "Some time along in the nineteen-eighties," he says, "when the world has left us as far behind as we have left the years that followed the First World War, somebody is going to publish a piece called 'The Late Forties.' I hope to be dead at the time. . . . The subject of this piece will be the conquest of the United States by the Russians."

This gifted writer goes on: "Never in the history of the world was one people as completely dominated, intellectually and morally, by another as the people of the United States by the people of Russia in the four years from 1946 through 1949." This was written before we learned that Russia had the atom bomb and when the United States was the greatest nation that the world had ever seen, and the richest, with the highest standard of living ever known, and with untold potentialities for the security and happiness of its people.

During this period, continues MacLeish, "American foreign policy was a mirror image of Russian foreign policy; whatever the Russians did, we did in reverse. American domestic politics were conducted under a kind of upside-down Russian veto; no man could be elected to public office unless he was on record as detesting the Russians, and no proposal could be enacted, from a peace plan at one end to a military budget at the other, unless it could be demonstrated that the Russians wouldn't like it." This is saying that since we are dominated—negatively, to be sure—by Russia, we have been conquered by it.

MacLeish might have explained that we have been subjugated by Russia because of our fear of Russia. He might have insisted that if man cannot live a normal life under the goad of fear, to an even greater extent is this true of a nation. When 150 million people get up in the morning in fear, worry through the day and go to bed at night in fear, their mass fear is superimposed upon their individual fears, resulting in a grotesque distortion of their lives.

MacLeish might have said that we are committing mass suicide. In other words, we will not be conquered; we will merely die. If fear—abject, ignoble, cringing fear—can cause an individual to surrender the domination of his own soul, so can base cowardice cause a nation to give up all that is worth living for. Such a result is death. It is not necessary to subjugate the dead; only a funeral is required.

"The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." This utterance by a leader of men brought the people of the United States from their knees to their feet. I thank God that Roosevelt is not here now to see a greater and a stronger America, not on its knees, but on its hands and knees, groveling before dangers of its own craven imagining.

Evidence of our cringing from fear of Russia multiplies. We no longer feel shame for our moral self-exposure. Candidates clamor against Communism so extravagantly as to create ever greater fear. Witness the Dulles campaign in New York. Fear grows by what it feeds on. Like a blinding fog, fear permeates our legislative chambers. Our executive officials, "by putting the hatred and fear of Russia first," govern us negatively, apparently not knowing that "the great nations in the history of the world have been the nations which proposed, the nations which asserted, the nations which conceived." Our quavering leaders do not realize that "the real choice is the choice between all forms of authoritarianism [including Communism] and the dream of a whole and responsible human freedom."

Fear of Communism is a great, open spigot that drains billions from the US Treasury faster than they can be accumulated. Our scientists pervert their truth-questioning minds in a search for surer means of annihilation. But while we fume at the totalitarianism that is Communism, we prepare to embrace the totalitarian fascism that also sought to destroy the freedom without which life would be too shameful to be worthwhile. We propose a garden hose for the feeble, corrupt Chiang Kai-shek gang to turn upon the unquenchable conflagration that is sweeping China. *Per contra,* we send warships to Spain to salute a fascist dictator who has destroyed the liberties of his people.

At a time so parlous for our country and for our Christian civilization, are we to allow our fears to pull us into "a coward's grave"? There is enough time, but no more than barely enough, to shrink back from the grave that is the fitting destination of the coward. There is still time, but no more than barely enough, to prove to the world that true Americanism will not submit to being consumed to dead ashes, from within, by unreasoning fear. Americans may still, if they make haste, prove that they are not cowards; that they do not propose to live upon their knees; that, without fear, they will courageously face, as they have done in the past, any danger from any source, be it physical or ideological.

HAROLD L. ICKES

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John Dewey

An appraisal of his contributions to philosophy, education and the affairs of men, presented on the occasion of his ninetieth birthday

MUCH OF this issue of the *New Republic* is devoted to John Dewey, whose ninetieth birthday is October 20. Symposia in honor of an individual too often turn out to be perfunctory eulogies in which the contributors repeat each other endlessly; we think our readers will agree that this is not true of the material on the following pages. It is a tribute, less to our contributors than to Dewey himself, that we can publish nine papers about him with hardly any repetition. As Ralph Barton Perry points out, Dewey thought and wrote on practically all the questions by which his age has been confronted. To religion, psychology, esthetics, logic, metaphysics and ethics, and to the practical disciplines of politics and education, he made substantial contributions. To most of them, his was the chief contribution of his generation.

If any other individual has equaled Dewey's effect on the intellectual life today, we do not know his name. Education in the United States has been transformed by him, and he has influenced even schoolmasters to whom his concepts are anathema, and who take his advice while imagining that they repudiate it. James and Dewey, together, sent philosophy around the sharpest corner in its history—a corner so sharp that many will say it was in fact derailed and still lies pitiably in the ditch.

The influence of Dewey's personality in parts of the world other than his native land has been marked, and has extended far beyond the realm of scholarship. China, where he lived for some years, was admiring him in residence at about the time when America was admiring Hu Shih—an interesting example of bilateral trade in philosophers. Turkey asked him to reorganize its schools; so did Russia. The Soviets followed his ideas with the utmost literalness for a few years and then decided that these did not jibe with dialectical materialism—as indeed they do not, or with any other philosophy which excuses totalitarianism.

It was inevitable that a man like Dewey should offer his goods in the marketplace of practical affairs. Just as his progressive method in education was the mortal enemy of the dictator in the classroom, so his whole outlook on life made him a political progressive, from his earliest days of battling the slum as a trustee of Hull House, down to his fight against Stalinism in Russia and the Stalinists in America. His major engagements in this field were fought during the thirties, when so many American liberals were still dazzled by the afterglow of a sun that had set with the death of Lenin.

Dewey's attitude as publicist and man of action did not wholly square with his philosophic position. Pragmatism is next door to the belief that every individual is the result of the parallelogram of forces which play upon him, and this in turn is near neighbor to *tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner.* Yet in his dealings with the Russians, for example, he was rather more the indignant moralist than the patient, aloof explainer of historical causation. This was perhaps inconsistent; but it added greatly to his effectiveness as a political pamphleteer.

Dewey has his weaknesses, and some of them are pointed out in the papers which follow. He has never fully absorbed the significance of the Freudian psychology, especially in its relation to infantile situations and their after-effects. Immersed in the formal processes of education, he gave less emphasis than he should have, as Gordon Allport says, to the influence of the home in shaping character. With his inveterate modesty, Dewey would be the first to agree to these, or almost any other, adverse judgments. But the very fact that such judgments are so few and so relatively unimportant, in the life work of a figure dominating many aspects of the entire twentieth century, is another testimony to the greatness of this man.

The Contributors

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THE INFLUENCE OF A FIRST-HAND MIND

by Ralph Barton Perry

THE SEVEN DECADES of Dewey's philosophical activity, beginning in the early eighties of the last century, are divisible into three phases: a decade of discipleship, a decade of emancipation and self-discovery, and five decades during which Dewey has been Dewey—decades during which certain germinal ideas that he has made his own have borne abundant fruit.

The beginning of the present century marked a turning point in American philosophy. It was felt to be such at the time, and it still appears to be such in retrospect. The last twenty years of the nineteenth century had witnessed the growing ascendancy in academic circles of that Kantian "idealism" which had already been imported from Germany—indirectly through such literary intermediaries as Coleridge and through British philosophers of the school of T. H. Green and the Cairds, and directly through the study of Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer and the German romanticists. The American representatives of this movement—Royce at Harvard, Garman at Amherst, Morris and Wenley at Michigan, Howison in California, Bowne at Boston University, Creighton at Cornell—were the great teachers of the period. They provided the clergy and the guardians of youth with a secular philosophy that supported the moral and religious tradition—replacing by imperceptible degrees the Scottish philosophy of "common sense" and the orthodox theism taught in sectarian circles.

The fundamental thesis of this philosophy was its insistence on the autonomy, or self-accrediting validity, of "reason," or "spirit," this being conceived as a faculty which directly discloses the categories and ideals by which experience is "organized" and acquires "objectivity." The view opposed itself not only to the sensationalistic empiricism of the British school, but also to Kant himself, in so far as Kant divorced reason from alien data to which it was obliged to conform. Reason, freed from dependence on sense-experience, could leap to conclusions about the universe which mere observation, however extensive, could never attain. The philosopher, as the spokesman of reason, could know in advance the necessities which nature and history were bound to obey. He could speak his mind with a sense of cosmic authority; and, since the intuitions and demonstrable truths which he voiced overruled the contingencies and causal nexus of the external world, he could claim to make the foundations of the moral and religious faith secure against the assaults of materialism.

In and about 1900, when this philosophy reached the peak of its influence in America, it was boldly challenged by two philosophers, both of whom had been engaged during the previous decade in gathering their forces for the attack. Although John Dewey was born seventeen years after William James, and felt the latter to be his "spiritual progenitor," James was Dewey's senior contemporary rather than his predecessor.

James's education was protracted and irregular, his work was frequently interrupted by periods of ill health, and he was for many years uncertain of his vocation. He tried himself as a painter, studied medicine, taught physiology, and passed from that to the teaching of psychology. After the publication of his epoch-making *Principles of Psychology* in 1890, he devoted the next few years to its aftermath; and then, toward the end of the decade, he formulated his philosophical position provisionally in the form of lectures and essays. This chronology should be qualified by the recognition of the inner continuity of James's mental development. He was always philosophical in his cast of mind, and his philosophy was anticipated in his psychology, as his psychology was anticipated in his physiology. The fact remains, however, that all of James's major philosophical works were written at the close of the last century and during the first decade of the present century, which was the last decade of his life.

While Dewey's period of philosophical growth was more condensed than that of James, and abridged the interval between them, it was less linear and continuous. James's earliest articles, published in the late seventies, clearly disclosed his philosophical bias, whereas Dewey underwent a conversion and rebirth. James, following the line of French voluntarism, found common ground with the romanticism of Royce. But his true philosophical ancestors were Locke, Berkeley and Hume; and, while he criticized them freely, he felt himself to be their legitimate offspring. Dewey, on the other hand, sprang from Kant and Hegel; and in order to reach his own philosophical maturity he was compelled to repudiate them. To James idealism was a formidable adversary, to which he was always antagonistic and which he gradually acquired the confidence and strength to overcome; to Dewey idealism was his own youthful error that he repented.

The relations of James and Dewey were not rela-

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tions of rivalry, still less of jealousy. They felt their community of thought and attitude to be much deeper than their differences. Each has generously acknowledged his indebtedness to the other. There are profound differences of genius and cast of mind; and among their posterity there will, perhaps, always be Jamesians and Deweyans, as there have always been Platonists and Aristotelians among those who have followed the Socratic tradition. There is, indeed, no little force in this analogy. James, like Plato, was comparatively dramatic, poetical, mystical, intuitive, inventive, fecund, versatile, witty, epigrammatic. Dewey, like Aristotle, is more tenacious, systematic, sober, methodical, circumspect, exhaustive, careful, rigorous.

The philosophical differences between James and Dewey should not be stated as differences of doctrine, but rather as differences of emphasis. The most important of these differences are traceable to the ancestors whose traits they could not, despite themselves, fail to inherit. No philosopher changes the whole of his mind. The inescapable ancestral residue in James is British empiricism; while that of Dewey is Kantian idealism. The pragmatism of James is less fundamental than his "experientialism"; that is, his insistence that things are what they are "known as," where knowing means sensible acquaintance with concrete particulars. Hence, for James, while knowing is a form of practice and is practically motivated, it culminates in a revelation or disclosure of existence. James's peculiar genius lay in his sensibility to the nuances of immediate conscious experience and his recognition, in opposition to Hume, of its transitive and connective tissue.

Dewey, on the other hand, true to his idealistic inheritance, insists uncompromisingly on the active character of knowing. The "operation" of knowing is not, as with James, preliminary to intuition, but is the end as well as the beginning of knowledge. It begins with the frustration of practical activity, continues in theoretical activity, and culminates in the resumption of practical activity. Discursive thought is not an imperfect substitute for perceptual immediacy, but is itself the very life of knowledge, of which perceptual immediacy is only the initiating occasion. Knowledge is the movement of thought—this is Dewey's idealism; the work of thought is a phase and a tool of practice—this is Dewey's instrumentalism; thought emerges from, and is contained within, the space-time world—this is the "naturalism" with which Dewey combats the rationalism and a priorism of his earlier idealism. His philosophy might be described (paraphrasing Kant) as a "Critique of Impure Reason"; or (after Hegel) as an experimental dialectic of ideas.

The explicit metaphysics of James, and the implicit metaphysics of Dewey, reflect this same difference. The physiognomy of the universe is revealed to James in perceptual experience, refined and amplified; to Dewey, in the process of trial and error—the passage from problem to solution. James's metaphysics reflects his experientialism; Dewey's, his operationalism. But the term "instrumentalism," as applied to Dewey's philosophy as a whole, is misleading, if it be taken to mean that thought is dependent and secondary. For Dewey, as in Hegel's doctrine of "objective mind," thought taken as a process is substantive. It is a special phase, exemplified in the intelligent action of living organisms, of that adjustment, conflict and readjustment which is characteristic of nature throughout its entire evolution.

This basic difference between James's experientialism and Dewey's operationalism indicates the locus of the most fundamental objections raised by Dewey's critics. Is the operation of inquiry a description and disclosure, or is it an exemplification, of the existent world? Is the existent world what it is known to be, or is it the knowing itself, naturalized and generalized? The first alternative leads to realism, the second to a new idealism: an idealism freed, no doubt, of the a priorism, absolutism, transcendentalism and eternalism of the older idealism, but still idealism, if this is taken to mean that the procedures and relationships characteristic of the knowing mind provide the key philosophic insight.

Since James's death in 1910, Dewey has flourished for nearly forty years. His preëminence among American philosophers is undisputed even by those who, believing that he is often an exponent of error, have difficulty in accounting for him. His preëminence cannot be explained by brilliancy of style, by the sheer impact of personality, or by any spectacular quality of achievement. It must be attributed, therefore, to his timeliness, and to the fruitfulness of his ideas.

Dewey's philosophical timeliness, like that of James, lies in his reflecting the fresh impulse communicated to the philosophy of the twentieth century by the science of the nineteenth century. This did not mean the abandonment of philosophy, or even of religion. It did not mean materialism. But it did mean sympathy with the spirit of science, and the acceptance of its results as first-class truth, to be extended, and not superseded or disparaged, by metaphyics. And in the field of science it represented the swing from the Newtonian to post-Newtonian physics, and from physics to biology and the sciences of man. In expressing this impulse the new philosophy opposed a reigning school of thought which, in America and Britain at least, had

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run its course, and had tended to degenerate into a kind of authoritarian orthodoxy. Dewey and James breached its academic strongholds, and opened the way for diverse fresh philosophical currents. Hence not only pragmatists, but realists, positivists, naturalists and reconstructed idealists, all feel that they owe a debt to Dewey; or, if not, they at least accept him as a symbol of their intellectual emancipation. They feel that he is on their side against the older traditions.

Dewey has allied himself with the technological emphasis of the present age in all its vast industrial and social ramifications and its fruitful applications. His experimental emphasis coincides with the approved techniques of modern scientific inquiry. His invincible repugnance to absolutes of every description agrees with the "probabilism" or provisional temper of contemporary scientific inquiry. For Dewey, as for modern science, no intellectual achievement is final. Every new advance enlarges the circumference of ignorance and begets new problems. And nature itself, for Dewey as for modern physics, consists not of an eternal order, nor of identical entities which repeat themselves, but of unique and fluid "events."

But Dewey's attitude to modern science is not a mere submissive acceptance. Within his cult of science he embraces that distrust of physical science which distinguishes the attitude of the present century. Physical science is not, in and of itself, automatically beneficent. Its applications provide an arsenal of destruction as well as of progress. Hence the belief, so widely held, that there is a time lag between man's control of his physical environment and his control of himself. If physical science is to be beneficent, its social origins and implications must themselves be embraced within the field of scientific inquiry. Of this sociological or humanistic critique of science Dewey is a leading proponent.

At this point it is necessary to introduce a caveat. If social science is to serve as a trustworthy guide of physical science, it cannot be merely "descriptive," in the narrow sense of that term. The development of the psychology of propaganda, for example, does not ensure mankind against the corrupting influence of a Goebbels, but only provides him with weapons which are more injurious in proportion as they are more "scientific." To judge the beneficence of science it is not sufficient that it shall be social, and not merely physical; it is necessary at some point to introduce a norm by which some results shall be held good and others bad.

There is no doubt that Dewey does introduce such a norm, though one might wish that it had been made more explicit. To find this norm it is necessary to go back to the role of intelligence itself. Intelligence is man's faculty of resolving conflict, and

FROM MY DETACHED POSITION as a public man, I welcome the opportunity to pay tribute to the grand old man of American philosophy. More typically American than any of them, he follows the great line opened up by Josiah Royce and William James, and has risen to an ascendancy to which they never aspired. Royce was still largely associated with the idealist tendencies which were prevalent in the European philosophy of his day. William James broke away from them and was largely responsible for the radical empiricist outlook which followed. John Dewey went all the way, and stands out as the typical embodiment of that practical, humanist, empirical tendency which has become the dominant outlook of America in our day. He, more than any other American thinker, has wedded philosophy to life and striven to make it a real force, not only in the thought, but also in the practice of his day. In that sense he is typical, not only of American, but also of European trends in the philosophy of our time.

Philosophy is not merely an esoteric pursuit of philosophers. It must play its part in building up the bridge which will carry us across the gap which has developed in the world outlook of civilized man. It must bring abstract thought to bear on the solution of the intolerable problems which face modern man in his outlook and his practice. Only the future will show how far John Dewey has been successful in his particular plan of bridge building. But of his practical sense and insight there can be no doubt. Like all reformers he has laid particular stress on education, the training of the young in the new outlook. And his claims in this connection have perhaps found even wider recognition than his more technical philosophic work.

As he has progressed in thought and in years, he has more and more laid stress on the new education of the young American. And in that way, in preparing —preparing young America for the future which awaits it, and for the intellectual outlook which will fit it for the world which science and technology have opened up for mankind—he has made a contribution for which we are all profoundly thankful. We hail this Nestor of thought and practical wisdom on attaining his ninetieth anniversary, and send him our warm congratulations from the farthest corner of Africa, the Dark Continent no longer.

—Jan Christian Smuts

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inquiry is its method. Conflict successfully resolved is harmony and fulfillment; intelligence so exercised as to perpetuate conflict is a failure of intelligence. In other words, the norm which places Dewey on the side of peace, freedom, justice and humanity is implicit in his conception of the specific challenge to which intelligence responds—his conception of the nature of the problem which intelligence is required to solve. Because truth is a function of intelligence, and because intelligence is invoked to solve the problem of conflict, and because the removal of conflict is good, therefore truth is good. None of the premises can be omitted if the conclusion is to be drawn.

Dewey's emphasis on *coöperative* intelligence enables him to endorse the new liberalism, with its shift from individualism to collectivism. He can sympathize with economic planning, which is the application of organized and long-range intelligence to the satisfying of needs; and he can sympathize with the growing intervention of government in behalf of equality and security, because government represents men's togetherness and participation as opposed to their atomistic and competitive egoism.

But while his social emphasis dissociates Dewey from the older liberalism of laissez-faire, whether economic or political, his emphasis on the autonomy of intelligence dissociates him from totalitarianism and identifies him with democracy. Society exercises intelligence through the individual. The individual is society's organ of intelligence, and its culminating product. The capacity of intelligence is the prerogative which confers dignity on human individuals; the realization of this capacity is the benefit which society owes to individuals. Human life, in the ideal sense, is the self-realization of intelligence, achieved through organization and embodied in emergent individuals.

These are the terms in which to understand Dewey's peculiar conception of democracy. Its opposite is authoritarianism or traditionalism, in which men live by opinions imposed upon them from above, or from the past, or from the environment. The freedom of men consists essentially in their making up their own minds. Men are equal in so far as they learn by their own experience and draw their own conclusions. The intercourse which is characteristic of democracy is that by which men's minds are awakened rather than hypnotized, quickened rather than molded. It is this central idea that places Dewey in the forefront of those who conceive the essence of democracy to lie not in the distribution of material goods but in the exercise and safeguarding of thought, expression and communication.

It is this same idea which constitutes the central core of Dewey's philosophy of education. It is customary to parody progressive education by the imaginary incident of the child who asks to be relieved of the painful necessity of deciding what he wants to do. The moral of this tale is the precise opposite of that which is ordinarily drawn. Whatever may be said of *so-called* progressive education, for Dewey it does not mean the pursuit of the line of least resistance. The easy course is to do or believe what one is told. To choose for oneself requires intellectual effort; to submit, to receive, to echo, to learn by rote, requires none. What is hard for the pupil or student is also hard for the teacher. The art of education lies in inciting the effort of choice by providing incentives. To exercise this art requires personal sympathy and understanding; to issue commands and lay down rules requires none.

It has sometimes been said that the explanation of Dewey's eminence lies in the sheer bulk of his production. It is quite true that Dewey's writing and publication have been incessant; the number of titles to his credit is enormous, and to any bibliographer (and no doubt to Dewey himself) appalling. It is quite true that he has written and published on every admissible philosophical topic; that is, on virtually every question which it has occurred to the human mind to ask. It is quite true that, judging by the record of the past, there is a positive correlation between volume and greatness. But it is quite possible to be voluminously second-rate—to be commonplace on all fronts.

Dewey's comprehensiveness has not been due to his feeling any professional obligation to publish views on everything, but to the fact that he has had something to say on everything. His eagerness to communicate and discuss is a living up to his own teaching that all inquiry, whether carried on in the laboratory, or in the classroom, or in conference, or in books and periodicals, is coöperative and experimental.

He has written on psychology, ethics, theory of value, theory of knowledge, metaphysics, logic, methodology, education, esthetics, politics and religion. In all these subjects he has had something to say, something of interest and value to the narrower specialists. In all these subjects he has thought freshly; laboriously, to be sure, often obscurely, as he himself has freely admitted, but never perfunctorily or imitatively. His mind is first-rate because it is first-hand. His place in the intellectual history of America is assured, and it is largely owing to him that America will henceforth take a central and not a peripheral place in the intellectual history of mankind.

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PRAGMATISM IN EDUCATION

by Boyd H. Bode

IT IS CONCEDED on all hands that John Dewey is our outstanding educational philosopher; his influence on American education has been immense. Perhaps one reason for this is that his philosophy has not been very clearly understood. If it had been, the enthusiasm for his teachings would doubtless have been tempered more extensively by fear, or at any rate by misgivings. But neither the language nor the emotional tone of Dewey's writings is of a kind to suggest that his teachings may fairly be described as revolutionary, even in a revolutionary age. They are so because, in presenting evidence that the forces which are operative in our civilization will inevitably bring on a crisis, they serve to speed up and give direction to the present period of transition. This is but a roundabout way of saying that Dewey's philosophy can scarcely fail to become a landmark in the intellectual development of our Western culture.

The simplest way to indicate the significance of Dewey's educational philosophy is to present his views against a background of traditional doctrine. The common feature of traditional educational creeds is the assumption that all teaching must be controlled by a fixed purpose or aim, itself derived from a theory regarding the nature of the universe. In other words, the content of the good life is to be specified in advance. This content or end may be the glory of God; it may be the cultivation of the intellect in preference to "practical" activities; it may be the pursuit of "happiness," or racial supremacy, or the dictatorship of the proletariat, or what not. All these rival theories of education are agreed that we must decide in advance on a final central purpose; they are also agreed that this decision must be based on a consideration of the immutable structure of things, which is about what is meant when we say that these theories are of a metaphysical or theological kind. Variations in such educational theories arise because people hold divergent beliefs regarding the universe.

This is not to say that all of the problems of life are to be handled in this manner. In learning how to sail a boat, build a shelter, stalk game or raise crops, we do not start with a theory of the universe. In so far as we go beyond blind trial and error, we rely on observations, on theorizing or guessing, and on verification or testing by further observations and perhaps experimentation. This procedure, after centuries of elaboration and refinement, came to be known as scientific method. In this procedure, metaphysical and theological explanations are irrelevant because the end in view is something closely at hand.

This empirical procedure in dealing with certain things is admittedly inevitable, life being what it is. Its importance, however, has generally been discounted; it was considered a low kind of thing, thought to have no purpose beyond immediate utility, or perhaps idle curiosity. It could claim validity or authority within its own domain, but this domain was pretty much restricted to the bread-and-butter phase of existence. It was not a realm in which one would look for high motives; it did not impinge on moral and spiritual standards. The two methods of procedure were supposed to get along harmoniously by dividing the field between them. If scientific method could only be kept from trespassing, there would be no collisions; and, incidentally, educational interests would be kept under the protecting care of metaphysical and theological auspices. The only trouble with this scheme was that the division of territory could not be maintained. Science and scientific method have invaded the surrounding territory everywhere. For decades now we have witnessed a running fight between science and theology. We are becoming accustomed to the discussion of such problems as unemployment, housing, public health, social security, and what not, as though they could be judged by purely social standards, apart from philosophical and theological creeds.

As it is sometimes put, we are rapidly becoming "secularized." The old basic scheme for living is steadily disintegrating. What we have instead is a collection of conflicts and confusions. It seems safe to say that there has been no previous generation of young Americans which could show anything like the present combination of wide information and basic lack of conviction. Our cultural life is coming apart under pressure from the inside. The situation has all the earmarks of a crisis. We no longer see life steadily and see it whole.

Dewey's great service to the present age is that he has clarified our understanding of the meaning of the impact of science and technology upon modern life. It is clear that the present state of unstable equilibrium cannot continue indefinitely. We must move forward or backward. Either science and scientific method must be made to stay within their appointed bounds and keep their profane hands off moral and spiritual values, or they must be given sovereignty—in all cases of conflict they must have the last word. In that alternative, the

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scientific method becomes the only final road to truth.

So far, the present generation has been unable to make up its mind, for the reason, presumably, that the issue is not clearly seen. We are not, most of us, ready to lay down a "party line" to our scientists, but we are too much in bondage to tradition to "carry over into any inquiry into human and moral subjects the kind of method (the method of observation, theory as hypothesis, and experimental tests) by which understanding of physical nature has been brought to its present pitch." (*Reconstruction in Philosophy*: Introduction to enlarged edition.)

A notable contribution by Dewey toward the clarification of the underlying issue was the manner in which he set the two procedures or methods in sharp contrast to each other. His analysis of scientific method has become fairly familiar. For present purposes, its outstanding feature is the fact that scientific explanations are treated solely as working hypotheses. If the working hypothesis does not meet the requirements, it is superseded by another candidate; which means that "infant mortality" in this field is high. It means also that "truth" has a special meaning here, and that the whole learning process appears in a different perspective. Truth here is not conformity to an alleged immutable cosmic order, but a relationship of meanings for guidance and control. The point of reference is provided by human expectations and purposes. The requirements to be met are set by the situation in which these expectations and purposes operate, and metaphysical and theological explanations become beside the point.

What is the contrasting procedure? If it is not permissible to treat a theory as a working hypothesis, it obviously becomes necessary to decide questions of interpretation by appeal to some form of authority, such as revelation, or intuition, or intellectual self-evidence. In the end this becomes an appeal to a test for "heresy." In theological matters, the final decision is made by an ecclesiastical agency; in Nazi Germany the rulings were made by a central political party; in Russia, according to current reports, the party decides on the meanings of such concepts as "bourgeois" and "counter-revolutionary." The only alternative to the view that theories are working hypotheses is a return to the position that patterns for education must be set by authority.

On this point Dewey is entirely explicit. "All absolutisms," he warns us, "tend to assume a theological form and to arouse a kind of emotional ardor that has accompanied crusading religions in the past." (*Freedom and Culture*, p. 83.) By contrast, "Scientific method in operating with working hypotheses instead of with fixed and final truth is not forced to have an Inner Council to declare just what is the Truth, nor to develop a system of exegesis which rivals the ancient theological way of explaining away apparent inconsistency. It welcomes a clash of 'incompatible opinions' as long as they can produce observed facts in their support." (*Op. Cit.* pp. 97-98.)

This penetrating analysis has momentous implications, and one of these is that a basic change is necessary in our conception of the moral life. If we stick to the idea of working hypotheses, moral truths are obviously not different from any other kind of truths. It is just as inappropriate to assume a predetermined fixed content for the moral life as it would be for, say, engineering or agriculture. Moral problems turn out to

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IN THE POPULAR MIND the college professor, especially if he belong to the department of philosophy, dwells in an ivory tower. Whether or not this conception holds good for the average professor, it cannot be applied to the career of John Dewey. Living constantly and vividly in the arena of public action, he has not only championed pragmatism, a philosophy of the practical man, but he has also been in the forefront of action himself. And when he has gone into action it has not often been on the safe and conservative side.

Few men have enriched the literature of philosophy in the measure he has contributed. The titles of his writings are so numerous that they fill a small book. One may ask whether the pragmatism in his writings does not constitute the best expression of an indigenous American philosophy. And whatever may be the criticism of his pragmatism, he is recognized even by his opponents as America's greatest living philosopher.

Assured as Dewey is of fame in the field of philosophy, he has achieved even greater renown as an educator. One must go back to Plato to find a philosopher who has had such a direct and abiding influence on the theory and practice of education as has John Dewey. His *Democracy and Education* is already a classic on educational philosophy.

Dewey's influence on education has been felt at every level, from the kindergarten to the university. This influence has been greater at the elementary and secondary levels; but higher education as well is glad to recognize its indebtedness to this great man. Happily, here is a philosopher who is not without honor in his own country and in his own lifetime.

—Charles Seymour
President, Yale University

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be special problems in adjustment, but the solution of these problems must be made in the light of circumstances and conditions. Moral progress will then have no fixed content but will presumably take the form of constantly widening participation by the individual in the common interests and common purposes of his group and other groups. At any rate, the shift will be from a morality of *cosmic* sanction to a morality of *social* sanction, from morality with a fixed content to morality that varies with conditions and circumstances as determined by empirical investigation; from a morality of authority to a morality of "social" consequences. It is a shift in the direction of "ends and standards so distinctively human as to constitute a new social order." (*Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Intro., p. xxxix.)

Another implication of Dewey's analysis is that scientific method and democracy necessarily go hand in hand. Democracy is often identified with concern for the individual and the disposition to give him a fair chance. It means more than that. As a people we are committed to the principle of separation of Church and State, a separation which rests on the assumption that morality can be separated from theological creed, that its final appeal is to "social" (as contrasted with "cosmic") sanction, that its basic concepts are working hypotheses and not immutable truths. There is no other way of replying effectively to the charge that our public schools can provide at best only an inferior "secular" morality, and perhaps not even that, since they do not supply a theological basis for moral beliefs.

The opposition to the current agitation for religious instruction in our system of public education is not based primarily on an awareness that divergent moral standards are in conflict, but rather on a deep-seated distrust of ecclesiastical domination. It is likewise the major reason for opposition to the expenditure of public money on parochial schools. This distrust has considerable historical justification, but it does not go to the root of the matter. Either democracy has morality of its own, or we must return to a type of educational control which we thought we had left behind.

The function of the philosopher, according to Dewey, is not to reveal eternal truth, but to expedite the business of revising the patterns for our social living in the light of changing conditions. "The distinctive office, problems, and subject matter of philosophy," as Dewey says, "grow out of stresses and strains in the community life in which a given form of philosophy arises." (*Op. Cit.*, Introduction, p. v.)

These stresses and strains which brought forth Dewey's own philosophy were caused by the impressive growth of modern science and the social changes which resulted. This development took place within a framework of beliefs and attitudes which had their origin in the pre-scientific age. Hence the precise nature of the issues involved was not clearly seen. Much energy was expended in constructing "reconciliations" between "science and religion," on the theory that the solution of the conflicts was a matter of arriving at a proper division of territory between scientific and non-scientific quests for truth.

Dewey's great contribution was the insight that the problem is not a problem of "reconciliation," but of reorientation. The notion that the scientific and the non-scientific or the pre-scientific points of view can be maintained indefinitely side by side is becoming more and more untenable. The necessity for basic reorientation means that the present age is one of the turning points of history, and that Dewey, as the preëminent philosopher of scientific method and democracy, ranks with the foremost thinkers of the past.

Even if all this be granted, it hardly explains how it happened that Dewey has exerted so profound an influence on American education. Classroom teachers are not primarily philosophers; and to most of them Dewey's significance with respect to "democracy" and "scientific method" is at best a nebulous business. Not at all nebulous, however, was the fact that educational reform of some kind was overdue. The traditional program, which focused elementary education on the three R's and advanced education on the classics plus mathematics, was becoming increasingly inadequate to meet the demands of the times. Science and technology were giving us a different world to live in—a world that progressively particularized the bright promise of individual opportunity which was nurtured in the days of the frontier. One important reason why Dewey acquired so great a following was that he provided an alternative to the narrow curriculum and the dreary mechanization of traditional education.

What the rank and file of the teaching profession saw in Dewey's philosophy was not primarily a different conception of the learning process based on the idea that all theories are working hypotheses. Perhaps it would not be far wrong to say that what happened was due to a hangover from pioneer days, when it was taken for granted that "liberty" and "democracy" were a matter of protecting the individual against outside interference. As applied to education, this meant that what was needed was not a basic reorientation or reconstruction of outlook, but protection against all forms of "imposition." Dewey's emphasis on interest, on learning by doing, on thinking as a form of achieving adjustment, was interpreted as a doctrine of individual-

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ism sometimes bordering on anarchy. It was serious misinterpretation, but it served a useful purpose.

The movement with which Dewey's name has been most closely associated became known as Progressive Education. It was a movement that brought important reforms—in school organization, in the relation of school and community, and in liberating intelligence for the improvement of human life. But the more penetrating elements in the community never surrendered the conviction that Dewey's philosophy meant something far more profound than sheer individualism. The next important step in education is to make this deeper meaning progressively more explicit, in order that this gospel of liberty and democracy, of which Dewey is the outstanding exponent, may be expressed in a genuinely distinctive way of life.

INSTRUMENTAL ECONOMICS

by C. E. Ayres

ECONOMISTS GENERALLY are as yet unaware of the profound significance of instrumentalism for the whole field of inquiry in which they are engaged. This is true even of those who hold John Dewey in high esteem as a philosopher. Moreover, it is not at all surprising. For several decades the civilized world has recognized Dewey as one of the greatest thinkers of our day, if not the greatest; and yet for the most part the world behaves, and thinks, as though he had never lived.

I am tempted to say that both economists and the world at large reject his basic principles, but that would be inaccurate. The truth is that notwithstanding his immense following, Dewey's basic principles are not yet generally understood even by scholars, and for obvious reasons. Instead of finding solutions for the problems we have all been struggling to solve, Dewey has tried to show us that we are asking the wrong questions; and that is hard to take. Not only are the questions immemorial ones; the efforts we have made to answer them, though incomplete and unsatisfactory, yet represent a commitment we are loath to jettison.

Certainly this is true of economics. For generations economics has been conceived as the science of price; and this conception has prevailed almost universally (even the socialists are firmly committed to it) not merely because prices play a big part in all our lives but because the price system, or market mechanism, has seemed to be the only possible instrumentality for solving a fundamental problem: the problem of value.

Nothing is dearer to the twentieth-century mind than the insolubility of the value problem. In this, as in so much else, conservatives and radicals make common cause. All agree that values refer to "ends"; and since science knows nothing of "ends," this necessarily means that values lie beyond the purview of organized intelligence. Ergo, they are, and necessarily must always be, matters of belief. To those who cherish the beliefs of the forefathers, this means that Western civilization must renew its ancient faith. Meanwhile intellectual sophisticates who believe in nothing nevertheless take pride in recognizing the importance of belief in community life. Thus at the midpoint of the twentieth century, sophisticates and dogmatists agree on man's essential irrationality.

At the time when "political economy" came into existence as an organized inquiry, lines were not drawn quite so sharply as they are at present. But the issue of values had already been raised. It was, of course, fundamental to the whole Protestant movement, and the form it took in classical political economy bore a strong family resemblance to that of Protestantism. Both appealed to the individual conscience as the sole feasible alternative to dogmatism.

In the case of political economy, individual conscience seemed to have a formidable ally in the market mechanism. But the tremendous importance which the price system assumed in the economic thinking of the eighteenth century, and has retained ever since, is not to be explained merely by the subtlety and complexity of the market mechanism. The essential point is "the obvious and simple system of natural liberty" which that mechanism seemed to make possible—liberty for every man to follow the promptings of his own conscience, or as Adam Smith preferred to say, his own "moral sentiments."

This is what lies behind present-day pronouncements that any deviation from "free enterprise" can only be a step toward imposing the values of some would-be dictator upon the community. Such pronouncements are being dinned into us today by businessmen whose only concern with ideas is to make shrewd use of them in the furtherance of their own financial interests. But the idea is there; and it carries weight because it is in key with our prevailing bewilderment, and because it is voiced by scholars who are themselves sincere and are under no illusions about the moral complexion of "free enterprise."

Thus the issue of "free enterprise"—than which

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none is more momentous—is not a matter of more-or-less. In our present state of despair and bewilderment it appears to be a matter of all-or-none. Since value judgments are essentially irrational, our only safety is in numbers. The question is not merely administrative: whether in any given case some alternative to "the rule of the market" may not "work" advantageously. In all such instances the overbrooding question is whether any departure from mass irrationality will not necessarily be in the direction of the far more dangerous, because conscious and purposeful, irrationality of some gifted but frenetic "leader."

But are values essentially irrational? It is at this vital point that the "instrumentalist" way of thinking of which John Dewey is the foremost exemplar challenges prevailing doctrine; and as always what is challenged is our traditional absolutism. We have always thought of values as referring to "ends" for two very obvious reasons. One is the evident continuity of day-to-day experience. One thing leads to another; and we find it convenient and meaningful to identify such relationships as those of "means" to "ends." Moreover, it is long-range relationships that are most important. Hurrying home is the "means" to the "end" of eating lunch; but promptness at mealtime has a long-range bearing on a happy home, as does a well-ordered life upon the long-range end of being healthy, if not wealthy and wise.

From this continuity, habitually conceived in terms of the "ends" that follow "means," it is only a step to the presumption that all finite "ends" look forward to some consummatory "End" whose meaning they share in some mysterious, Platonic, fashion; and this step is made all the easier by the tribal mythology. That, precisely, is what the tribal mythology of every people does: it gives a name to the purported "End" of the whole life process. Aware as we all are of the continuity of our experience, and saturated in tribal mythology as we all are, it is small wonder that we have formed the deeply ingrained habit of thinking of values (that is, means-ends relationships) as Platonic essences, necessarily derivative from some consummatory "End." Thus we go on doing so even after we have become quite sophisticated about tribal mythologies, and this is the source of all our bewilderment concerning values. If (as we have been accustomed to think) all values refer to ends, and if that to which all ends refer has none but legendary meaning, then, however fictional a community's mythology may be, the community is nevertheless utterly dependent upon it and departs from it only at great peril.

But must we always continue to think as we have been accustomed to think, even after the principal reason for doing so has been removed? Does our common experience enforce such reasoning? Dewey's answer to this question is, of course, no. Detached reëxamination of day-to-day experience makes it unmistakably clear that we are not dependent for the organization of our behavior upon reference to remote ends. On the contrary, day-to-day experience reveals no generic difference between "ends" and "means." Every (arbitrarily distinguished) item of our experience is both an end and a means. There is no difference of "substance" or "essence" by which, in the continuum of day-to-day experience, "means" and "ends" can be distinguished.

In short, values have the significance of process, not of substance or essence. Furthermore—and this is the crux of the whole matter—there runs through all human behavior a continuous, developmental process from which all the achievements of mankind have flowed. This, of course, is what Dewey has called the instrumental process. All creative intelligence, all systematic inquiry—the good and the beautiful, no less than the true—derive from it. It is, indeed, the life process of mankind; for even tribal legends and taboos, and the institutions into which the habit-systems of all organized communities have perennially congealed, eventually respond to it and submit to the changes which it has made possible and necessary.

This conception of value in terms of process has infinite constructive possibilities. As Dewey himself has explicitly stated, what he calls the instrumental process is identical with what economists call technology. Hence the continued and maximal growth of technology provides an objective, factual criterion of economic value that is not a matter of taste at all and so bypasses the disjunction according to which the only alternative to the prevailing winds of popular taste as revealed (more or less adequately) by the "free market" is the bureaucratically imposed taste of the reformer-dictator. Economists have long defined their central problem as the allocation of existing resources. In a world in which everybody wants more of everything, the master question is, Who shall get what? To this question the technological-instrumental principle supplies this answer: existing resources should be so allocated that there will be continually more to allocate.

The blindness of our world to the immense constructive possibilities of Dewey's way of thinking is one of the major anomalies of twentieth-century civilization. People still insist that value cannot be a matter of process because they feel in their hearts that it is a matter of essence, and that the instrumental principle is limited "by definition" to the mere instruments—which

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is to say "means"—to the attainment of "ends" concerning which it tells us nothing. In this spirit economists dismiss the technological criterion of value as meaning only that we should "make more machines to make more machines to make more machines."

But this is nonsense. Thinking in terms of process is alternative to thinking in terms of "ends." To say that it does not solve the problem of ends is only another way of saying, "I propose to persist in my error regardless of anything you say." This is a very common human failing. But fortunately as knowledge increases we eventually outgrow such infantilism. The truth is that creative intelligence has always thought in instrumental terms, and always will, because that is how we think.

We have always judged our achievements—those of the fine arts no less than those of pure science, and those of science no less than those of the mechanical arts—in terms of their fructifying effect upon further achievement in the same, and related, fields. A great painting is one that furthers the art of painting. A great symphony is one that ushers in a new era in music. A great scientific discovery is one that opens up new fields of discovery. So, likewise, a great economy is one that builds enduring foundations for a still greater economy. That is to say, the criterion of greatness is implicit in the life process of mankind. To say that greatness so conceived is "a mere matter of size" is to reject the life process in favor of tribal fetishes.

Judged by his own principle, John Dewey is indeed truly great. For what he has shown us is a matter of fact. It is not a matter of how, in some tribal or transcendental sense, we ought to think, but a matter of how we do actually think. Since it is a matter of fact, it will eventually prevail; and as this comes about, John Dewey's historical stature will grow. The economics of the past acknowledges a philosopher as its chief architect; and so will the economics of the future.

PURE SCIENCE AND GROSS EXPERIENCE

by Ernest Nagel

MODERN SCIENCE is not primarily concerned with the uses which things have in specifically human contexts, but rather with the invariant conditions under which events occur and with the mutual interrelations of things. For example, theoretical physics operates with distinctions that are both highly abstract and apparently incongruous with notions employed in habitual experience. In point of fact, the objects postulated in modern physics, such as atoms and electrons, possess by their very definition few if any of the qualities that identify and mark off the familiar things of human life. Neither colors, nor sounds, nor odors, nor even determinate positions and shapes are attributed to the fundamental particles of current sub-atomic theories. If physics is assumed to disclose the ultimate and exclusive characters of things, there is an obvious discrepancy between what the sciences apparently teach and what is found in gross experience. How tempting and seemingly cogent, therefore, is the explanation of this discrepancy which relegates the distinctions and principles by which we order our daily lives to a realm of subjective appearance!

This conclusion, moreover, is often supported by another line of argument. The physics and physiology of perception show that the qualities commonly attributed to things are in fact manifested only under special conditions, among which must be counted the presence of biological organisms. It seems plain, therefore, that the directly apprehended qualities are not traits which things possess absolutely and independently of their interaction with organic bodies. Since such qualities do not belong to the "world of physics," it is concluded that they do not form part of the objective order of nature. In brief, things are not what they seem. On the other hand, every actual inquiry into the causal patterns of nature takes its point of departure from immediately experienced qualitative events, and it also terminates in such an experience. For it is in the precarious existence of qualitative events that the sciences find their problems; and it is in the agreement of their occurrence with assumed laws that evidence for the latter is obtained. But if the qualities encountered in common experience are held to belong exclusively to a realm of subjective appearance, while the mechanisms discovered by physics are taken to constitute the true reality, then science is indeed at war with itself. On this analysis, therefore, one is left with the choice of either accepting natural science but rejecting as basically illusory the things that constitute men's most familiar and valued experiences, or accepting the objective character of the common-sense view of things but denying the validity and relevance of modern science for matters of prime human concern.

It is this alleged impasse of modern science, so paradoxical in its formulation and so devastating in its practical consequences, that has been at the focus of Dewey's attention during his long philosophical career.

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He has consistently maintained that this impasse is generated by misconceptions concerning the relation of the objects and distinctions of physical science to the things of ordinary experience. And he has identified as one of the outstanding problems of modern philosophy the clarification of just this problem.

Dewey has been intensely concerned with the problem, because he recognized early in his career that mistaken notions about the status of physical objects stand in the way of successfully exploiting the potentialities of modern science for the enrichment of human life. His ultimate concern with the technical problems of the theory of knowledge is thus moral in intent. He has noted repeatedly and with untiring zeal the fatal import of the traditional dualistic interpretation of science for the other paramount issue of modern philosophy—the integration of men's beliefs about the world as derived from natural science, with the principles in terms of which men direct and evaluate their private and public conduct. Such an interpretation effectively deprives the tried logic of scientific method of any authority in the treatment of morality, and kills in the bud the promise implicit in the scientific enterprise of freeing men from the bondage of frustrating custom.

Dewey's analysis of the relation of scientific objects to matters of direct experience is rooted in one firm assumption which he does not always make fully explicit. He operates from the premise that distinctions must be understood in terms of the concrete uses for which they are devised, and that in particular scientific ideas must be construed in terms of their identifiable functions in the context of inquiry. This assumption is unavoidable in any responsible analysis, and is in any case decisive. Unless scientific conceptions are construed in agreement with it, any proposed interpretation of scientific discourse will be arbitrary; it will be based on preconceptions derived from some tacit philosophical commitments, rather than on the actual operative meaning of the language of science. Thus, an essential feature of Dewey's strategy consists in showing that the problem vanishes when once the traditional preconceptions which generate it are successfully challenged.

It was Einstein who advised students of the methods of theoretical physics to concern themselves, not with accounts scientists happen to give of what they do, but with their actual procedures and achievements. Long before this advice was given, and long before it became fashionable to preach the virtues of functionalist or contextualist analysis, Dewey was practising it with energy and a considerable measure of consistency. It is from this standpoint that he has carried intellectual war into the camps of traditional philosophies of science; and by adopting that approach he has saved himself from much futility and avoided some serious errors. It has prevented him from regarding scientific theory as merely a condensed transcript of the immediate content of experience, as well as from attempting the impossible task of translating theoretical statements into statements about directly apprehended sensory qualities. It has led him to emphasize the continuity of refined scientific procedures with modes of solving problems on more primitive levels of behavior, and to recognize in consequence that the conception of scientific theory as a system of mere fiction makes incomprehensible the whole practical life of man. It has enabled him to see that the adequacy or validity of ideas is not warranted by their supposed derivation from materials of sense, but rather by the consequences of their use. And above all, it has served him as the means for showing that science is not a disclosure of a reality superior to and incompatible with the things of ordinary experience.

It follows directly from this central thesis that scientific discoveries cannot possibly impugn the objective reality of ordinary experience. Why should the fact, for example, that the occurrence of heat and cold is contingent upon certain distributions of molecular energies, constitute ground for denying that the sun is hot or that snow is cold? And why should the further fact that in the absence of definite physiological conditions these qualities are not manifested, count as a reason for denying that heat and cold are objective features of those existential situations in which both the physical and physiological conditions are realized?

To be sure, physics is not concerned with the physiological conditions for the occurrence of various qualities; for physics seems to find relational orders of dependence that are invariant for all percipient organisms, and that are independent of the latter's presence or absence. But what is canonical for physics is not therefore a measure of objective existence; and only an arbitrary preference, rooted in an influential intellectual tradition, will assign exclusive reality to invariant relational orders. In point of fact, even the properties which physics ascribes to its objects, such as mass, are manifested only under certain contingent, if pervasive, conditions. The crux of the matter is that if only absolutely invariant universal patterns of relations are assumed to be genuinely objective, nothing that is individual, specific and limited can have any place in objective nature. But those who adopt this criterion are then faced with the outrageous paradox of having relations without terms to be related as the sole furniture of genuine reality. Is the notion of a cat with a grin

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but without a body a more fantastic conception of the way of things?

Dewey's account of scientific objects is thus accompanied by a reaffirmation of the claims of gross experience. But the naïve realism he defends is free of the dogmatic naïveté so frequently associated with philosophies of common sense. He emphatically includes the various qualities of ordinary experience among the ultimate material of the world. But he does not assume that the immediate apprehension of qualities constitutes knowledge of them. Knowledge for Dewey is always the terminus of inquiry, and involves the establishment of relations of dependence between what is thus directly experienced and what is not. What these relations are, however, is not to be settled by intuition or authority, whether the problem under consideration involves issues of physics, private morality or public policy. It is preëminently a matter requiring reflective thought or experimental inquiry.

Indeed, it is precisely in this context that the objects of science manifest their distinctive functions. It is in situations where one seeks to discover the conditions upon which the occurrence of immediate qualities depends, that scientific objects serve as general schema for analyzing things of ordinary experience in terms of their systematic relations to other events and potentialities of nature. Accordingly, the postulated objects of theoretical physics are not things which in turn require to be sensed or directly experienced: they represent ways of conceiving and ordering what is capable of being sensed and experienced. No legitimate puzzle resides in the fact that the objects of physical theory do not possess the qualitative differentia of things of everyday experience. A mystifying puzzle does arise only if the former are converted by some dialectical prestidigitation into another set of individuals which require to be directly encountered if they are to be adequately known.

Despite the brilliant dialectical skill with which Dewey develops his interpretation of science, and notwithstanding the substantial evidence that the history of science provides for it, it cannot be claimed that his views on this subject have won general assent. The difficulties of his literary style are notorious, and have handicapped even first-rate minds in their attempt to penetrate to the essentials of his philosophy. Moreover, his theory of logic is in effect and by implication a serious intellectual threat to social views whose chief support is tradition and authority; and it would be utopian to suppose that antecedent ideological commitments on the part of his readers have not played a rôle in their evaluation of his conception of science.

Then there are also less external reasons for the hesitations which even those in full sympathy with Dewey's aims and over-all conclusions have experienced with his account of natural science. The great William Harvey is reported to have said of Francis Bacon that he wrote about science like a Lord Chancellor. Of Dewey it can be said with equal justice that he writes about science like a philosopher, whose understanding of it, however informed, is derived from second-hand sources. With rare exceptions, the illustrations he supplies for his major theses on the nature of science and its method come from everyday inquiries of a fairly elementary kind, or from popularized versions of the achievements of theoretical science. It is indeed curious that a thinker who has devoted so much effort to clarifying the import of science should exhibit such a singular unconcern for the detailed articulation of physical theory. His writings often give the impression that, however sound his views on the status of scientific objects, they have been arrived at by a priori reasoning from general assumptions concerning the nature of knowledge which he takes to be warranted on other grounds. He does not use the language customary to discussions of scientific

MR. DEWEY is, in my opinion, the most influential thinker of our time and our nation, not because he has given the right answers, but because he has asked the right questions. During the period of his teaching, we Americans have been trying to make the cultural readjustment required by the impact of "Science" upon the ideas, the preferences, the institutions of a people who interpret themselves as devoted to "Freedom." In the making of that attempt we have, of late, seemed not to care much what our philosophers were saying. It has apparently made little practical difference to us whether those philosophers were right or wrong. But John Dewey, whether right or wrong, has always been significant. His errors, if he has made any, have done damage. His insights, as he has won them, have done good. In a word, his thinking has been relevant. It has dealt with living issues, with urgent and actual problems. Because of his leadership in that respect, because he has kept philosophy alive as an active influence in guiding the thinking, the feeling, the deciding, the acting, of the American community, I gladly record myself again, on his ninetieth birthday, as one of his most ardent followers.

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objects, possibly because he believes this language to be so burdened with traditional associations that in employing it one becomes hopelessly entangled in the preconceptions of dubious epistemologies. Nevertheless, the general absence from his writings of detailed analyses of specific theoretical constructions, as well as his tendency to introduce distinctions that are not fully explained, has produced in many of his readers a feeling of inconclusiveness.

There is a disparaging sense, moreover, in which Dewey has been a lone wolf in the formulation of his ideas on science. His central views are in close agreement with conceptions developed during the past half-century by physicists concerned with the methodology of their discipline. But, though he is obviously familiar with many of these analyses, he does not appear to have been strongly influenced by them, and he cites them only rarely. What is more to the point, he does not use these specialized and expert studies to the best advantage in his own discussions; rather he employs home-grown arguments and formulations even where more convincing ones are readily available. This tendency no doubt contributes to the freshness of what Dewey has to say; but it also serves to isolate him from a major contemporary stream in the philosophy of science.

There are also difficulties that stem from certain basic obscurities in Dewey's language, if not in his thought. According to him, as has already been noted, scientific objects are conceptual means devised for analyzing and transforming existential subject matter. And he does not weary of emphasizing that scientific objects are general *modes* of activity, that they are discursively elaborated *formulations* of connections noted in experience, that they are *correlations* between changes, or that they are *generalizations* of existential conditions founded on a statistical basis. Careful readers of Dewey do not find it overly difficult to see the congruence among these various characterizations. But even the most sympathetic of his readers, if he is at all critical, experiences discomfort in reconciling some or all of them with other statements by Dewey. For example, he feels free to talk of swarms of atoms and electrons moving rapidly, or of atoms giving rise to qualities of bitter and sweet. Surely, modes of activities, formulations, and the rest, cannot intelligibly be said to engage in motions, rapid or otherwise, or to give birth eventually to sensory qualities. There is thus a puzzling ambiguity in Dewey's presentation of his views, and not all of his readers have persuaded themselves that the inconsistencies in his writings are only verbal ones.

It is not easy to escape the conclusion that Dewey's discussion of the relation of physics to ordinary experience constitutes a program rather than a systematically complete analysis; and Dewey is probably the last man on earth to suppose that nothing more remains to be said on the subject. But it is a program accompanied by a refreshingly sane and wise perspective on things, a clarifying conception of the significance of science, and a wealth of brilliant *aperçus*. In stating it, he has shown beyond possible doubt that the traditional and fatal antithesis between science and ordinary experience is gratuitous, and he has thereby helped to remove some of the intellectual obstacles to the expansion of science and the consequent enhancement of human life. In stating it, he has also entrusted to those who must succeed him in the endless task of criticism which is philosophy, an objective for whose realization the best energies of philosophers would not be misspent.

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE FOURTH R

by Gordon W. Allport

More than any other living thinker, John Dewey has conferred upon American psychology stability and a sense of destiny. Without his steadying influence its course would have veered more than it has under the impact of eccentric winds—Freudian, behavioristic, mentalistic, physicalistic.

This service Dewey has been able to perform because his own view of human nature is at its core so essentially American. Psychologists in Berkeley, in Chicago —anywhere in the United States—can read Dewey and say, "Yes, this is basically what I believe." I do not mean that they are all his followers. I mean only that mental science in this country is best epitomized in Dewey's steady emphasis upon mind-in-use, upon man's spiral of adjustments in a changing environment. In recent years the controversy between schools of psychology has noticeably abated and, unless I am mistaken, the trend is ever more marked toward the active, processual, whole-man type of psychology steadily advocated by Dewey during the past half-century.

But ought we to speak, with implied favor, of an *American type* of psychology? There is no typically American chemistry, nuclear physics or physiology. Science must be universal, or it is nothing. Is it then to Dewey's credit if he epitomizes a provincialism? Specifically, in his ardor for democracy has he embraced a too sanguine view of human nature and its capacities?

This is an intriguing accusation. Although in prin-

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ciple it can be levied at social and psychological scientists anywhere—for their interpretations are usually in terms of national and ideological criteria—still the criticism has special interest in the case of Dewey. For one thing, he himself saw the issue long before the days of Mannheim and the sociology of knowledge. Speaking at the University of California in 1899 he observed that the system of postulates and theories that one adopts in psychology is likely to be politically conditioned. Aristocracies, for example, foster theories that disparage the capacities of the individual unless the individual is of the higher classes.

One may wonder why Dewey, being possessed of this insight, forthwith proceeded to tailor his own view of human nature to fit the requirements of democratic living. That he did so there can be no doubt. True psychology, he insisted, "is itself a conception of democracy." False are all absolutes that play into the hands of the elite. Instincts, for example, imply that human nature is unalterable—away with instincts. Objectionable too is any doctrine that sets limits to the capacity of human beings for self-improvement—away with the IQ. Dualism of mind and body, of thought and action, is taught by those who wish a monopoly of social power, since it would permit them to do the thinking while the masses carry out the assigned actions—away with dualism. Imitation is a perilously aristocratic doctrine—it must not be allowed to dominate our theory of learning.

In the course of his presidential address to the American Psychological Association in 1916 he said:

> The ultimate refuge of the standpatter in every field . . . has been the notion of an alleged fixed structure of mind. As long as mind is conceived as an antecedent and ready-made thing, institutions and customs may be regarded as its offspring.

Even though Dewey's psychological theories are thus, in part at least, ideologically derived, they may still be fundamentally correct. The origin of a theory tells us nothing at all about its validity. His attitude seems to be: let others test my theories; until disproof is forthcoming I shall leave them as they stand, lock-stitched with democracy. Though not an experimentalist himself, Dewey's system allows abundantly for, and warmly invites, empirical testing.

His inspiration has set hundreds of investigators to work on the task. They have explored the fields of learning, thought, communication, public opinion. Broadly speaking, they have confirmed many of Dewey's major assertions. Researches conducted in the school, in industry, in the clinic, lend him basic support. The new and vital movement devoted to the study of human relations—the Fourth R, it has been called—is Deweyesque in its conception. It finds, as Dewey predicted, that under favorable conditions men are able to participate in their own political and economic destiny, and are eager for the adventure. One could, of course, point out certain spots where Dewey's emphasis needs correction in the light of empirical findings. He fails, for instance, to place as much weight as he should upon the early home life of the child. Attitudes crucial to democracy, studies reveal, are more often learned at home than at school. But this is a detail.

For the skeptical reader I should add that the modern findings generally so favorable to Dewey's theories are based not upon American researches alone. We know now a good deal about human behavior in concentration camps, in primitive communities and even in totalitarian lands. Although there are indeed cultural variations, it turns out that democracy's view of the psychological capacities of man provides a surprisingly good fit to worldwide empirical data.

THE UNITED NATIONS Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in whose work I have the honor of sharing, is striving for the fundamental education of all peoples, to the end that defenses of peace may be built more effectively into the minds of men. Many of the concepts upon which this endeavor rests have found noble expression in Mr. Dewey's educational writings. He has taught that education may be purposefully used to eliminate evils and to realize the best hopes of men in an improved society; that emphasis must be placed on all that frees individual capacity for growth directed to social aims, as well as on coöperative endeavor opposed to international jealousy and distrust; and that "the chief means of continuous, graded, economical improvement and social rectification lies in utilizing the opportunities of educating the young to modify prevailing types of thought and desire."

I am not here concerned with applying the technique of the doctoral dissertation to prove the direct relation of this thought to that of the guiding spirits of UNESCO, but only to say that, as I interpret him, his beliefs have become part of the blood stream of that organization. Therefore, Mr. Dewey can observe aspects of the educational philosophy he has upheld so long, living and working in a context as wide as the world.

—Luther H. Evans
Librarian of Congress

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JOHN DEWEY is one of the few living men who exemplifies the meaning of the word "philosopher" in its ancient, full and rich significance. Quite aside from any agreement or disagreement with his specific or even general opinions, the whole character of his intellect and his temperament is what a philosopher's should be.

So much has been said about his enormous influence—and few men have ever exerted more—that it might be well to stress instead the qualities which have made him so admirable an example of man thinking. The innocent candor which first strikes anyone who meets him is also the most striking characteristic of his thought, and it is perhaps a paradox that one who stresses so strongly that utility is the final test should nevertheless be one who took so few short cuts to any supposed usefulness and exhibited the detachment, the continuous openness to conviction and the remorseless fairmindedness so often not conspicuous in those who preach disinterestedness. A man who so resolutely believes that truth comes first is perhaps unusually rare today.

—Joseph Wood Krutch

Dewey is an environmentalist—an extreme environmentalist. Speaking of human motives, he argues that they are not simply inner urges, "lump forces, like the combustion or gravity of old-fashioned physical science." Even in the case of hunger and sex where nature demarcates the channels, these alleged drives, he insists, are indefinitely varied in content and in experience according to their social contexts. Since motives are thus diversified by the social situation, they are endless in number and defy classification.

In his later writing, especially in the *Logic*, he exalts still more the role of the environmental situation. Custom, he finds, is particularly significant, for it supplies the framework of thought and action within which the individual is compelled to move. Cultural and ecological determinants have grown more and more important to his mind. He explicitly states that his broadened account of the nature of man's surrounding situation is "fatal to the view that social sciences are exclusively, or even dominantly, psychological." But it would not be difficult to show that this shift in emphasis corresponds to a growing catholicity in social psychology itself. Starting in Washington research bureaus during the recent war, and in universities since that time, the fusion of disciplines (psychology, sociology, psychiatry, anthropology) has proceeded at a spectacular pace. Dewey would approve the trend.

It so happens that Dewey's productive years span almost exactly the lifetime of modern scientific psychology. In 1882, just three years after the founding of the first psychological laboratory at Leipzig, he began to write on topics of mental science. His textbook (1886) reflects both the ebbing tide of transcendentalism and the upsurge of the new positivism. It would be hard from this book to know what position he himself favored.

It was William James's *Principles* that helped lift him from the fence where his early writings had precariously perched him. Habits, interests, the stream of consciousness, were precisely the concepts he needed to implement his growing concern with education and with democracy. Soon Dewey surpassed James in consistency of thought, though never in brilliance of writing.

Many of Dewey's central concepts (habit, action, environment) are dear also to behaviorism. Yet Dewey never embraced this meager model. To him habit is a far more open system of tendencies than it was to the behaviorists—or to James—and far less a matter of ball-and-chain. And while the enlarged concept of habit serves as the core of his most influential book, *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), he does not allow it in his total system of thought to overshadow the rational function of the human mind. Continually he is concerned with man's capacity for inquiry.

His five-step analysis of the process of thinking, set forth in *How We Think* (1910), has become a household creed. Whenever we are plunged into situations that are inherently doubtful, so the analysis runs, we normally proceed from (a) a feeling of difficulty to (b) its location and definition; we then (c) make suggestions for possible solutions, (d) test these by reasoning, and (e) confirm our acceptance or rejection of suggested solutions by observation and experiment.

Rarely does Dewey offer neat formulations of this type, for he is ever wary of "clefts and bunches" lest they obstruct rather than aid our transactions with the novelties and delicacies of nature and life. Since psychology is the science of democratic living it must allow fully for progressive interpenetration of thought and action necessitated by the changing situation. Mental life fits badly into rubrics.

This lack of fixed points of reference in Dewey's system makes at first for a mild vertigo in the reader, whether he be a layman or a psychologist. How much easier to say with Freud: all personality is divided into three parts—the id, the ego, and the superego. But in their hearts psychologists know that Dewey is right. It is impossible to make true statements about fragments

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of mental activity that have been snatched from their natural context.

As befits a philosopher, Dewey's interests are primarily normative. He is not a laboratory psychologist. There is no record of his conducting a single controlled experiment, nor devising or administering a psychological test. Once only (in 1894) did he publish what psychologists would consider a standard observational study—on children's language. Yet in spite, or perhaps because, of this detachment from the mainstream of psychological research he has been its valued monitor and friendly mentor. He has said in effect: Your duty is to develop a science of the complete man, the sort of man who will eventually be capable of living productively in a full-fledged democracy of his own creating. You cannot do so without maintaining a flexible, dynamic, social and rational point of view.

An additional gallant service to psychology might be summed up in the inadequate term *promotion*. Dewey has made its propositions indispensable to philosophy, to education, to politics. Whitehead once remarked, with a twinkle in his eye, "Philosophers ought not read much psychology; they ought only to criticize it." Dewey would not agree.

Morals, for him, deals with wants, habits, choices—and these activities can be fully illuminated only with the aid of psychology. *Logic*, the science of inquiry, depends in part upon what the psychology of the thinking process reveals. *Art* as a form of experience comprises attitudes and habits that psychology must help identify. *Politics* leans heavily upon psychological discoveries concerning the nature of communication, discussion, persuasion. *Education* in large part is a psychological discipline. The whole philosophy of instrumentalism requires that proximate goals, next steps, be accurately geared to the present condition of men's minds. Human betterment becomes plausible and practicable only when psychology is prepared to do its part.

In thus recognizing the role that psychology can play in normative philosophy and in social progress Dewey confers upon it status and encouragement. He holds up to it a high ideal of achievement. For generations to come psychologists will be working by the light of this torch.

THE LITERATURE OF DIVERSITY

by George Boas

THERE ARE TIMES in Western cultural history when it becomes proper to give the name of a philosopher to an epoch, as we name periods in political history after kings. When we think of the period running from the third century B. C. to the fourth century A. D. as Aristotelian, or of the nineteenth century as Kantian, we are not speaking merely in tropes, for there is scarcely a fragment in the philosophy of the former in which Aristotelian terms and phrases do not appear, as in the nineteenth century the slogans of Kantianism recur and recur until no one asks what their meaning might be.

The influence of a philosopher, Descartes for instance, upon literature is seldom direct. When we say that Racine is Cartesian, we certainly do not mean that the dramatic poet first read the *Discourse on Method* or, better, the *Treatise on the Passions* and then decided to write in the Cartesian spirit. But Racine lived in a Cartesian period, one in which psychological—and some other—information was couched in the Cartesian language. The long analyses of the emotions which are characteristic of his *tirades*, the perfect mechanical balance of his couplets, the geometrical structure of his plays—for the syntax is part of the language—like the structure of Poussin's paintings, are all indications of an unconscious absorption of Cartesianism into his manner of writing and composition. No one could escape that influence in the latter half of the seventeenth century, any more than one could escape the influence of Newton or of John Locke in the early eighteenth. It is in the fixing of an intellectual climate that such men affect their times.

Similarly there is no one of the present generation of Americans who can have escaped the influence of John Dewey. We are not a public given to the reading of philosophic treatises; one has only to submit one to a publisher to discover that. Moreover, Dewey's works are written for the most part in a kind of prose which captivates the attention only of those who grit their teeth and swear that they will master it or die in the attempt. It has neither the limpidity of Descartes nor the poetic color of Plato, especially as Plato is usually transmitted to Americans, via Jowett. The bland and somewhat supercilious manner of Santayana, the hard precision of Cohen, the carefully qualified structure of Lovejoy, are all absent from it. If Dewey has influenced American literature, it is as a pervasive cultural force, not as a man whom everyone has read and studied.

But Dewey is exactly such a cultural force. There is probably no reader of these words whose schooling has not been modeled on a pattern laid down by Dewey. As a philosopher of education in America, he has been

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the outstanding influence not only on the curriculum, but also on the methods of instruction. If the generation which grew up after 1920 no longer studied the classics, no longer believed in a set of sacred texts which must be mastered, no longer wrote English after the fashion of Blair's *Rhetoric*, the reason is that their teachers either went to Teachers College and learned directly from Dewey that there was a new philosophy of education, or read his books under the prescription of his pupils, or used books written under the influence of his pupils' books. There was no way of avoiding this. The correct and the incorrect, he had shown, were no longer adherence to eternal and unchanging rules, Platonistic forms incorporated for all to observe in the writings of Addison, Burke and Goldsmith. Writing was expression and its form was to be determined not externally but internally, not mechanically but vitally.

A new set of adjectives of praise came into current usage. The vital, the dynamic, the purposeful, the creative, the expressive, the forceful, the powerful, took the place of the harmonious, the unified, the balanced, the coherent, the orderly. To avoid ambiguity was now impossible, for if a term were to be univalent, it would have to remain in the same context over and over again. And contexts were seen to shift and change like spots of oil on water. To freeze the meaning of a term became an impossibility, and one was driven to guessing at meanings, to catching them as they slid by and before they shifted. The rate of change need not be exaggerated; it was never believed to be quite so rapid as Dewey's opponents maintained. But the principle remained the same and one accepted vagueness as an inevitable consequence of expression.

This was most clearly expounded in Dewey's writings on logic. Logic was no longer for him the extraction of forms of thinking, set up, so to speak, prior to the thinking. Logic was the method of inquiry, an experimental method to be judged by its success, not by its elegance. Though that is no longer the dominant theory of logic in American universities, it must be pointed out that the dominant theory has concluded that all formal thinking is tautological, a "cascade of equations," to use a phrase of Henri Poincaré.

The echoes, for I fear to say the "influence," of Dewey's approach to thinking and expression are heard in almost all writers of the post-1918 generation who have not succumbed to the temptation of Traditionalism, as expressed by Messrs. Babbitt and More in this country, by Maurras, Léon Daudet, Bainville and Massis in France, and by Eliot in England. Even so old a writer as the late Ring Lardner, who, I imagine, is by now a classic, illustrates this in his curiously vital rhythms. Lardner succeeded, it is generally agreed, in catching the actual intonation of speech better than any of his contemporaries. But to catch the actual intonation of speech is to forgo the imposition of standard patterns and to submit oneself as a writer to what a scientist would call Nature. That he could have built up his short stories in submission to what he observed, rather than, like O. Henry, by constructing them out of possible combinations and permutations of situation, is testimony to the pervasiveness of instrumentalism.

Similarly the younger Hemingway, in his first short stories, seemed to be recording what he had experienced rather than what he had planned. These innovations, Faulkner's, too, were not simply the recording of "living speech"; they were also the capturing of the flow of life, without beginning, middle or end, a longitudinal cross-section of intertwined events. In such fiction, plot is abandoned, if one means by plot the

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WHAT ARE Professor Dewey's chief contributions?

To philosophy, two contributions stand out. First, Dewey starts his philosophizing with life as we live it and accordingly works at life's most significant problems in terms of life itself. Thus he philosophizes by the method of inductive science. Second, Dewey makes process the central feature of his philosophizing. Prior philosophies had long held that essential things do not change. Darwin had upset this by showing essential changes continuously at work. Dewey took as his task to remake philosophic thinking inductively on the basis of process—a great task, but his great achievement.

To education, also two great contributions. First, that education and philosophy belong together. As philosophy works to solve life's greatest problems, so education works to realize in character and living life's meanings as found by philosophy. Second, that education is accordingly not best conceived as mere preparation for life, but as actual living itself. Education thus begins and remains a process of living and learning, the living being continually elevated and enriched by ever more of meaning being learned. Thus does education find both its aim and its process.

How great a man is Dewey? In philosophy he is, in my judgment, the greatest our country has produced and one of the very few greatest of all history. In education, he is the greatest thinker the world has produced.

—William Heard Kilpatrick
Columbia University

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JOHN DEWEY'S philosophical and educational ideas were of the greatest significance in the founding and development of Bennington College. For seventeen years Bennington has in a sense been a proving ground for many of his theories and its experience gives ample and concrete evidence of the fruitfulness and greatness of his ideas. Since, in my own education and professional training, Dr. Dewey's influence has been dominant, it gives me particular pleasure to acknowledge the indebtedness of Bennington to one of the great, seminal minds of our time.

—Frederick Burkhardt
President, Bennington College

sort of structure found in Dickens and Thackeray.

There was another strain in Dewey's writings which was a powerful influence in changing the minds of writers. Dewey did not merely object to formalism because it was formalism, but rather because he believed it to be an expression of a dead society. One has only to read his comments on the survival of Greek science after the death of Greek society to see why he was pleading for a kind of thinking which would be adequate to the problems of the present. To the Greeks, he maintained, with slaves to do their manual work, the contemplation of eternal forms was a delightful possibility; to the modern it is decadent fiddling. Modern man lives in a world of action, not of theory; he wishes to control, not merely to observe the world. He is living in time and he no longer has the leisure to escape from it into eternity. That leisure was given to the Greek upper classes by the peculiar structure of their society. Our society does not permit such luxury. This point of view, though not peculiar to him by any means, Dewey did more than any other single American to popularize, and he expressed it in his social philosophy as well as in his historical and logical treatises. He helped make us conscious of our differences from our predecessors, whereas his adversaries spent most of their ink in pointing out our similarities.

As a result, the old concept of Mankind as a universal and eternal essence, as everywhere the same and at all times the same, disappeared. Like all abstractions, it was a tool by means of which we dealt with groups of things, like the letters which we use in algebra. It represented no more of a common essence than could be discovered. If all men were actually alike, then their likeness must be granted; but one does not assume ahead of time that because we call all featherless bipeds by the same name, *Man*, therefore they must, regardless of our findings, be alike. Our job became that of seeing how far they were alike and how far unlike and not of praising them for their similarities and of blaming them for their dissimilarities. In literature this meant the frank acknowledgement of the provincialism of most of our comments on human life. We could no longer naïvely transfer the traditional values of Western Europe to other parts of the world and wonder why they did not hold good. Nor could we flatly assert that even in Western society there was a supreme value binding on all men in all occupations, of all religions, dedicated to all purposes. The philosopher became a student of human nature, not a dictator to human nature; the critic an observer and interpreter, not a bestower of rewards and punishments.

In the eyes of the opposition, this was the abdication of the critic's task, and much of the reaction against Dewey's instrumentalism in its esthetic form is precisely a disapproval of this nominalism, as it would be called. The opposition wanted universal and eternal values; the instrumentalist was satisfied with Here and Now, so long as he understood them. Hence there arose a literature of place and date, of people and at most of social classes, of the deviant as well as the conformist, a literature which might have terminated in unintelligibility had it not been guided by the writer's desire to comprehend and expound what he had observed. One can of course write a novel of the inhabitants of the Lower Mississippi or of Georgia Crackers in which they act and speak like the heroes of the *Iliad*—are they not all men? But Faulkner and Caldwell seemed to assume that the problem of such people did not arise from their kinship with the ancient Greeks but rather from their differences from them.

In too familiar words, the writer in this current of artistry refused to make the distinction between what has been called Art and Life. As Dewey in his early educational books had maintained that school did not prepare one for life but was a part of life, so the contemporary writer who had gone to school with Dewey, whether he knew it or not, acted as if literature were a part of life. The art of writing became simply the absorption and reinterpretation of experience, and consequently one could not apply the same standards of excellence to a novel by Henry James that one would apply to a novel by James Farrell. One could call the two, if one approved of them, by the same adjectives of praise and thus fool oneself into thinking they both shared the same literary essence. But upon reflection it turned out not merely that Farrell was a different person writing about different people, with emphasis on the difference, but that consequently the verbal expressions as well as the organization of material would necessarily be different. Oddly enough, it has

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taken a Frenchman, Sartre, to see how fundamentally the American novel differs from the traditional European novel. It accepts diversity as real, not as something superficial which must be explained away, and it thus startles or offends the reader to whom the subject matter and the style are foreign.

The reaction, as found in the disciples of Babbitt and More, and now of Eliot (the earlier pair used to be called the New Humanists—one of the ironies of nomenclature) has been violent. Apparently, for the evidence is largely conjectural, they have refused to consider the social, cultural and ideological influences which made the peculiar themes of European fiction what they were, but held that such themes were rooted in the nature of Man. Yet the erotic conflicts which play so large a part in Occidental fiction would have been unintelligible in Greece and, I dare say, in China. Similarly the religious themes, feelings of guilt, of estrangement from God, expiation, self-sacrifice, and so on, which appear to many of us to be universal themes intimately related to the very being of the human psyche, turn out to be as peculiar to our form of culture as its kind of eroticism. There is, to be sure, a kind of dogmatism—seen in some of the French Catholic writers and, unless I have misread him, also in Eliot—which by fiat announces that the Judeo-Christian tradition is the human tradition. If one accepts this dogmatism, clearly deviation from the tradition becomes either the result of ignorance or of degeneracy or of willful perversity. So some Catholic anthropologists of the early nineteenth century held that savages were but degenerate children of Adam who had strayed at the time of the destruction of Babel.

Followers of Dewey could not of course accept so simple an explanation of human diversity. The word, *man*, at most denoted an animal with a certain sensory equipment and the diversity of his culturally determined traits was accepted not as a problem to be explained away but as a datum which might explain other things. One's own culture contained similar diversities, among which was the variety of ways in which even our so-called basic drives could be satisfied. The legitimacy of the diverse was accepted even in the case of members of the same family, whence the program of self-development in its most exaggerated form. This is the fundamental program of the "modern" artist, whether he be painter, sculptor or writer. But the new freedom of self-development carries with it the old responsibility of communication: a responsibility not always successfully discharged.

Of all the varieties of pragmatism, Dewey's has been most pervasive of American thought, and most of the writers who have come to maturity since 1920 have gone to schools in which the educational theories of Dewey have been programmatic. In weighing his effect on literature, however, we are in the realm of tendencies, not of systems, tendencies which may appear sometimes merely as linguistic usage. If in this sense of the word it is right to speak of the influence of a man, it is highly probable that no one philosopher has had more of an influence upon the American literature of today.

THE CONQUEST OF DUALISM

by Wilmon H. Sheldon

JOHN DEWEY is not usually thought of as a metaphysician. His interests have been largely on the practical aspects of philosophy: education, morals, social problems. On the theoretical side he has treated more the method of philosophy than the results it may bring. But of course his views on concrete problems stem from his view of man's place in nature and of how man can most profitably adapt his ways to nature's laws. The like is true of his studies in method. One's method of thinking goes with one's view of nature. And this view of nature and man's place in nature is a metaphysic. To be sure, Dewey has never presented a big, rounded-out system like the systems of Aquinas, Leibnitz, Hegel, Whitehead; his is only a general statement of the make-up and ways of nature and of man's mind. What then is peculiar to this general statement? Does it contribute some new insights? Does it perhaps have a perspective not found in the older systems? It does indeed have a different perspective from theirs, and the insights following therefrom.

That perspective is often called temporalism or process-philosophy. It sees nature—and man as part of nature—ever in process, changing, developing, evolving, full of potencies which man himself may bring to light to serve his own progress "onward and upward forever." Not material progress only, not merely better transportation, washing machines, synthetic food; moral or spiritual progress, too, in the ways of peace among nations, new forms of art, mutual respect and toleration, and the like. True, this temporalism is not original with Dewey; it has for decades been a growing conviction in European-American philosophy, stressed of late by such well-known thinkers as Bergson, Alex-

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ander, James, Whitehead. But Dewey has made his own use of it. He has drawn consequences pivotal for a metaphysic; if others have drawn some of them too, none has emphasized them so tellingly, so influentially and consistently.

Briefly, his contribution to metaphysic is twofold; or better, it is one doctrine with a negative and a positive side. On the negative side he exposes the besetting sin of past philosophy, explaining why philosophers have disagreed so much; on the positive side, he demonstrates the general scheme of nature, with man at its highest level, a scheme showing how needless have been the disagreements. The negative side is a revolt against old tradition, a reform, a "Reconstruction in Philosophy"—the title of one of his books. The positive side teaches a new view of truth and reality, a view due to the thoroughgoing process-perspective which reveals nature in a novel light.

The metaphysic of the past went wrong because philosophers did not realize that nature, reality, the universe (call it what you will) is all of one piece. Their systems teemed with dualisms. They viewed the universe as partitioned off into two separate regions; on the one hand, the world all about us in everyday life, on the other a spirit-world inaccessible to man in the flesh, where dwell God, angels, immortal souls. The traits of one world are inconsistent with the traits of the other. Spirits cannot have physical properties, size, weight, momentum, inertia; but they know and they love. Bodies have size, momentum, and so on, but they cannot know or love; does the moon know the sun and love it? So the older systems divided reality into two parts foreign to each other, neither to be derived from the other—how can anything give rise to its contradictory?—an ultimate mystery and puzzle. And as the thinker inevitably seeks one consistent system, he insists that one of these realms is but appearance, the other is genuine reality.

From the surface view that spirit and matter are different, arose the conflict of idealism and materialism. But it is illogical to think there can be two such separate realms: Nature, reality, must be all of one piece. There is no separate supernatural world. What then of religion? Is there no dwelling place of Deity, Deity so sorely needed by man? God exists, says Dewey, but here and now in the world of nature. He (or It, for Dewey would prefer not to speak in personal terms) is that great trend in nature favorable to man's highest ideals. There is indeed such a trend, such an *élan vital*, a principle of progress witnessed in the evolution of life. This is Dewey's theology, stated in his book, *A Common Faith*. Spirit-matter is a continuum, the unbroken continuity of nature with no supernature. And this is Dewey's naturalism.

Yet even a philosophy of naturalism enbodies the old dualism in a new form implicit in the teaching of Descartes. And most modern philosophy has followed the Cartesian mind-body dualism. Is not material nature in the rocks, rivers, air, irreducibly different from the conscious minds within us? How could either be described in terms of the other, still less be derived from the other? No more than supernatural spirit, has our everyday human consciousness weight, momentum or other physical traits; no better than before can we understand how a material body can know

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MY FIRST CONTACT with John Dewey dates back fifty-six years when he and Mrs. Dewey dined at my parents' home. I was then a serious-minded girl of fifteen living in Chicago. The University of Chicago opened that year of 1893, and John Dewey was a member of its remarkable first faculty. Thus began an influence on my thinking which it would be impossible for me to overstate.

Unknown to me at the time, the University brought as a freshman to its first class my future husband, Wesley Clair Mitchell. John Dewey was his teacher. Though my husband, after some hesitation, turned from philosophy to economics, he carried into his own profession the conception of economics as a study of human behavior—a line of thinking stimulated by Mr. Dewey.

It was the impact of John Dewey's thinking that made the study of the learning process in children and the interaction between human beings and their environments seem imperative to me. Not that he guided my own work or that of the Bank Street Schools in tangible ways, though in our early struggling years he was always ready to go into our problems with us. His influence was more intangible. It was a part of his general gift to our generation—the challenging of old assumptions about "human nature," the stimulus to find out what children are really like, the courage to think freshly, to observe, to record, to experiment, the acceptance that education is a social science and that educators need must take scientific thought about their role in society.

I am profoundly grateful to Mr. Dewey for releasing my mind from many fetters, for broadening my conception of a teacher's job. And I am deeply glad that I am of the generation who experienced the cultural changes that John Dewey in a large measure helped to bring about.

—Lucy Sprague Mitchell

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JOHN DEWEY'S IDEAS have been at work for half a century in every part of American education. It is the mark of his genius that within Mr. Dewey's system of ideas there is a closely knit and active body of insight into the actual solution of educational, social, political, moral, and philosophical problems. These insights lead to direct action, and have helped teachers and administrators to see that the individual student is the central factor in all educational programs; that vocational and liberal education cannot be separated if the demands of society and the individual are to be met; that the end of education is the use of knowledge for the improvement of society and the enrichment of individual lives.

Each aspect of this philosophy of education has exerted a profound effect on the working areas in American schools and colleges. Our educational system is freer and more liberal because of the life work of John Dewey. In his educational philosophy we find a plan for the continual development of a free society.

—Harold Taylor
President, Sarah Lawrence College

and love. Dewey's philosophy again resolves the paradox: mind and body are not in separate compartments, the private and the public; rather are minds just events in the public world of nature. As there is no *super*-natural so there is no *intra*-natural region. Reality again is all of one piece, continuous throughout.

There is still another form of the dualism. Here is the external world and here are you, knowing it. Is it there whether you know it or not? And is not your knowing merely a mental state, quite other than the thing known? There would, indeed, seem to be two separate worlds; the external world of facts and the internal world of thoughts. And no philosopher has been able to prove by analysis of your thoughts that there is a real external world. The remedy applied to the earlier dualism is again valid: there are no two such separate realms. Your thinking is *in* nature, a part of nature just as a tree or river is a part of nature. Reality is all of one piece, all parts akin, continuous.

Dewey does not forget that there are real differences between minds and bodies, a true distinction between the knower and the object known; a tree does not think, but men do; your consciousness of a chair isn't the chair. Though there is no dualism as of irreducible substances, there is yet a duality. Here we come to the positive side or phase of his metaphysic. What, stated in positive terms, are the deep-seated differences just noted? They are differences of *process*, of behavior, function, action.

The process-philosophy sees everything in constant change. Things ordinarily treated as permanent, the hills and rocks, and at the other extreme ourselves, are only things that change more slowly. But change is not just disappearance, as the Buddhists teach; it is production; it shows power, efficacy. Differences in things are differences of behavior, of functioning. A rock differs from a tree because it behaves differently, your mind is your body behaving in a certain very complex way, a way in which unconscious bodies like trees and stones cannot behave. In what way then? Take the case of knowing, characteristic of the conscious mind. What is it to know an object? What does it mean to know that the object in your hand is a pencil? Obviously it means that you can use it to write with. If you knew it as a knife, you would try to cut with it. Knowledge means power to act properly, successfully, with the object. Knowing is potential or tentative acting. If (to use Dewey's example) you are lost in the woods and then discover—know—the way out, your knowledge means ability to *get* out.

Knowledge is not (in C. W. Morris' apt phrase) a glassy eye contemplating a ready-made object; knowledge is a power, a plan of action. True knowledge or truth is a plan that can be carried out; false knowledge or error is a plan that cannot. If you tried to cut with a pencil or write with a knife, the plan would fail. There lies the difference between truth and error. Reality is the object of action for man; action thoughtful, of course, planned out beforehand, tentative, experimental, until we see whether the plan can be carried out or not. The whole perspective is now shifted away from the old point of view which regarded knowledge as a still, beholding awareness not describable in terms of natural things in the external world. If mind is one sort of process and body is another sort of process there is no mystery as to how either can act on the other.

Dewey's process-perspective is a deep-going, a revolutionary change (Copernican, Dewey has called it). It alone enables us to avoid the old dualisms that divided Western philosophy into hostile camps. All previous philosophy in Europe and America, stemming as it did from Greece, viewed mind, knowledge, thought as *theoria*—quiet, inactive, beholding. The purely contemplative or theoretical perspective persisted up to the time of this modern process-revolt, and still influences most thinkers of our day. It went with the old Greek spirit of leisure which considered bodily work degrading, the task of slaves. Dewey denies that

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contemplation is higher than action. Action is integral to thought. Neither is anything without the other. This Copernican revolution the sciences have demonstrated, embodied in their experimental method. What is a true scientific theory? It is a hypothesis that enables the experimenter to carry out the experiment as he expected to carry it out. This pragmatic doctrine, justified by its success in scientific procedure, has been quite misjudged by the philosophers who retain the old Greek attitude. It is an inclusive, a synthetic view, not at all a skeptical relativism; theirs is the one-sided view of knowledge as *excluding* the active phase of mind.

On the other hand we must say in criticism that the doctrine that nature is all of one piece does seem to exclude certain points which Dewey as a pragmatist ought to admit. The *independent* existence of stars as yet unseen, even of the oceans and rocks of our earth, is accepted by good pragmatic scientists. We daily assume this as a basis of our behavior, when we prepare to see the external world on waking in the morning. We behave, we *have* to behave, as if there existed a world in itself quite apart, cut off from our seeing it. So too with men's private minds. If a man is morally responsible, his deeds originate in a choice *confined* to his mind alone, to some degree independent of influences from the public world. There *are* holes and gaps in nature. Dewey, denying this, goes beyond the commonsense beliefs of practical man. After all, the difficulties above stated which drove him to the one-piece doctrine are purely *theoretical* difficulties. Why shouldn't the universe be composed of utterly different kinds of stuff and substance, inexplicable in terms of one another?

THE ETHICS OF NATURALISM

by Y. H. Krikorian

In the last hundred years or so, great changes have taken place in our conception of the physical world, of man and society, as well as in our pattern of living. The theory of organic evolution, by establishing continuity between man and other living beings, has shown him to be a product of nature. Social and cultural researches, by uncovering a large variety of culture patterns, have given a clearer account of the structure of society. At the turn of the century, relativity and quantum theories provided us with a new picture of nature. Equally striking have been the changes in our mode of living. Technology and industrialization have imposed new shapes on our civilization. There has been an intense urbanization, and a consequent change in community and family life.

John Dewey, who was born in the year Darwin's *Origin of Species* was first published, passed through all these changes, and his philosophy was shaped by the demands and conflicts that resulted from them. Philosophy, if it is to be significant in a culture, has to deal with the important issues of that culture. The major conflict that characterizes our civilization, as Dewey has persistently maintained, is between the growing power of science and technology on the one hand and the lagging moral attitudes and social institutions on the other. Traditional morality, with its pre-scientific attitude, is still a pervasive factor, but it is out of harmony with the demands of contemporary life. Science has established continuity between man and nature, but the older morality is still based on extra-natural sanctions. Science insists on observation and experiment to solve our problems, but the older morality demands fixed standards or imperatives. Technology and industry have rendered obsolete institutions to which the older morality still clings. There is a sharp dualism within our civilization: how shall we resolve it?

Dewey deals boldly with this cleavage between science and traditional morality. His central thesis is that it must be overcome by naturalizing ethics—by placing man in nature, by determining moral values and standards in terms of human experience, and, above all, by using the experimental method in dealing with ethical problems. To naturalize ethics is to change it into an empirical enterprise. But this process does not mean for Dewey, as is sometimes believed, that the ideal aspects of life should be disregarded or belittled; what it does mean is that continuity must be established between them and the natural conditions of life.

Dewey's naturalistic ethics, in its broad outline, is clear and impressive, but many of its details are open to controversy. His analysis is not always easy to follow, and some of his arguments are involved and seamless. But for the present we should not be diverted from the broad aspects of his ethics, which constitute a major philosophic contribution to our era.

Ethics is concerned with human conduct. On the whole, this concern has two aspects, or differences in emphasis. One of them has been the formulation of rules or imperatives to check desires or impulses. In this sense, ethics is primarily a matter of what one should not do or of what negative commandments one should obey. Yet in its positive sense ethics is less

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interested in such prohibitions than in discovering and realizing ends or values; the object being to make of life a worthwhile experience. Dewey has always emphasized this positive aspect. As far back as his *The Study of Ethics: A Syllabus*, written in 1894, he expressed his conviction that amid the prevalence of "pathological and moralistic ethics, there is room for a theory which conceives of conduct as the normal and free living of life as it is." From this standpoint the task of ethics resolves itself into one major inquiry—the search for the nature of human good. Dewey's ethics in this positive sense involves many important ideas. I shall consider some of the more distinctive ones.

First, if ethics is concerned with good, we should try to understand what Dewey means by the term *good*, or rather by the term *value*, the latter being more commonly used in contemporary philosophic discussions. Value is a central idea in ethics. Such terms as "good and bad," "right and wrong," "justice and injustice," and "the highest good" involve the notion of value. Some find the source and meaning of value, especially when the adjective "higher" is added, in some extra-empirical realm or notion, like divine authority or an a priori absolute; others find the source and meaning of value in natural, human experience. Dewey's view of value is of the latter kind.

Usually those who claim that the source and meaning of value reside in human experience identify it with desire or interest. "Value consists," writes a contemporary philosopher, "in the fulfillment of an interest as such"; and by interest is meant "a subject's liking or disliking." Cigarettes have value for those who like smoking; music for the lovers of music; power for ambitious men. This view has been effectively defended by Santayana, Russell, and especially by Perry, whose words I have just quoted.

To a certain extent Dewey agrees with this standpoint, since it connects values with concrete human experiences and satisfactions, and thus avoids the pallid remoteness of purely rationalistic or non-empirical approaches. Yet he finds the formulation limited and inadequate. For Dewey, if desire is to yield a meaningful notion of value, one must introduce a judgment, a comparison, or an appraisal. What he is insisting upon may be illustrated by the difference between desire and the desirable, between satisfaction and the satisfactory, between liking and the likable. In the

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second member of each pair the notion of estimation, criticism, appraisal is involved, so that desire or liking has acquired new properties.

Valuation, from this standpoint, is concerned with the means-consequence relation. In this sense medicine is good for the patient, and a car for one who intends to travel. Moreover, valuation as appraisal is a prescription, not merely a description, of fact. When a doctor tells a patient that a certain way of living is good for his recovery, he is not merely stating a fact but giving a rule, which the patient must follow to regain his health. Finally, and this is important for Dewey, appraisals and judgments of value are open to empirical verification. The doctor's prescription is not something purely personal; it is based on the facts of the situation.

If value is what is appraised, the transition to ethical value is a natural and an important one. Many values are amoral. When one says this pen is good, this musical piece is pleasant, a summer vacation on the seashore is better than one in the mountains, one has no moral question in mind. Morality deals only with certain types of value, those designated by "right" or "wrong." What is the meaning of these ethical terms?

Dewey's analysis of ethical value is not as incisive as his notion of value in general. In reading some of his writings one gets the impression that there is no difference between value judgment and ethical judgment. Yet when Dewey's ethics is considered in its broader setting, he does make a distinction. Whenever "alternative possibilities" or "better-or-worse" qualities have important social, human consequences, they attain moral quality. He sees the distinction between value and ethical value as a matter of degree—of the importance of alternative actions to human, social interrelations—rather than a matter of difference in kind. In this sense, as Dewey rightly argues, any act may attain moral quality. Walking in itself is a trivial, amoral event, but if it involves going at some risk to another's aid, it may take on a moral meaning.

More precisely stated, morality is concerned with conflicting desires which "promise opposed goods" and "incompatible courses of action" in relation to their effect upon human interests and social relationships. The consequences involved in "incompatible courses of action" may be rather limited, as when the use of one's money is concerned; or they may be of worldwide importance, as when the use of the atomic bomb is concerned. The task of morality is to examine critically the consequences of alternative actions, to appraise them, in some cases to suggest a new alternative action, and finally to resolve the conflict through thought in such a way that the result will be beneficial to both the individual and society. Morally this result will be the right one, the one that ought to be. And "thought" here, should not be taken in the rationalistic sense of apprehending certain non-empirical moral truths, but in the experimental sense of finding ways and means to solve the given problem.

Another important aspect of Dewey's ethics is his treatment of moral standards or ideals. The traditional moralist finds his standards already fashioned for him and sanctioned under such pretentious titles as "the moral law," "the moral order," "the wisdom of the Fathers." These absolutes are to be regarded less as means of solving behavior problems than as symbols to revere, to be loyal to. Moral experience, as Dewey sees it, is not movement toward some well-defined and fixed goal which authority or reason can formulate in the form of universal maxims or categorical imperatives; rather it continually feels its way toward fresh sources of insight in order to exploit the potentialities of life. In this process, moral standards should be regarded as hypotheses to be verified by experience, as instruments to guide us in our attempt to keep pace with expanding knowledge and opportunities.

Dewey has been frequently criticized for the relativistic implications of his ethics; and some of his sayings might justifiably provoke such criticism. But what he is primarily concerned with is that moral ideals should be allowed to grow and not be frozen into fixed, authoritarian rigidity. Even such a fruitful ideal as liberty, unless modified in its meaning and application in relation to concrete circumstances, may cease to be an agent in the beneficial shaping of experience.

Nevertheless, Dewey's ethics does contain a near-absolute standard for conduct. It is growth, growth of the individual and especially of society. "Growth itself," he writes, "is the only moral 'end'." He pitches aspiration high: "Nothing but the best, the richest and fullest experience possible, is good enough for man." Growth or progress thus means increase of rich meanings, especially in present experience, and this increase is in all dimensions—finer sensory distinctions, harmony, and unification. Therefore Dewey's categorical imperative is this: "So act as to increase the meaning of present experience." Ultimately, it is in terms of this imperative that acts have to be determined as good or bad, right or wrong. A major consequence of the identification of moral ideals with growth is the need to supplement the narrow, self-centered individualism of the past with a new social conception of individuality, an individuality consonant with the industrial conditions under which we live.

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But even this inclusive ideal of growth should not be mistaken for a fixed absolute and thus be changed to a sterile standard. To achieve the more richly informed concrete qualities of experience one should steer clear of abstractions and carefully study the specific needs and alternative possibilities within a localized situation. "Till men give up the search for a general formula of progress they will not know where to look to find it."

There is a final question to be considered. How will human good and satisfaction be realized? Here we come to Dewey's idea of the relation of means to ends in ethics. Dewey has tirelessly insisted on the importance of this relation. He is eager to make ideal possibilities actualities, and the method he suggests is the determination of the true relation between means and ends.

For Dewey, means and ends form a continuum. Ends—or, better, ends-in-view—are the construction of a series of means. Apart from means, ends have no basis. Anyone genuinely interested in an end, such as becoming a musician, must be affectionately concerned with the means of achieving this end—that is, with a knowledge of musical pieces and instruments and with the requisite techniques. Moreover, in the continuum of means and ends, means are ends for the time being, and ends are means for new ends-in-view. The relation of means to ends is a continuous process in life; the distinction between them is purely relative.

The final character of an accomplished moral act depends on the character of the means used; the end is really the summation of the series of means. A democratic ideal cannot be attained by non- or anti-democratic means, since the democratic way of life is means and end in their continuous interrelation. A moral society cannot be constructed on the basis of immoral means. Thus morality applies to means as well as to ends, to the various parts of our activity as well as to the activity as a whole.

Moreover, if means and ends are internally related, then the reconstruction of morals must lean heavily on the sciences, especially on the social sciences. Intelligent formulation of morals in sex, business, politics and international relations depends heavily on the specific empirical facts in these areas. Without these facts and their use, morals in such fields are sentimental. The sharp separation between means and ends, between material conditions and ideal ends, between science and morals, must cease. Apart from material conditions, ideals are merely ineffective aspirations; apart from ideal ends, material activities tend to become narrow and harsh.

The central theme that runs through Dewey's analysis of means and ends and through all his ethical discussion, is the belief that intelligence expressed through the experimental method should be applied to moral problems and conflicts. Whether this method will succeed where the traditional methods of authoritarianism and absolutism have failed is itself an experimental question, but it is an adventure supremely worth undertaking.

Dewey's ethical system forms a coherent, comprehensive and vitally effective whole based on the facts of life and the possibilities of experience; yet this

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ethics may be enlarged in certain directions within the framework of his experimental philosophy.

It should be noted that, despite his thoroughgoing empiricism, Dewey has not given sufficient consideration to the empirical question of the content of moral ideals. Pragmatically it is of great importance to enrich the content of desirable moral ends, since the richer they are the more effective they will be in conduct. What type of individual life, family relations, economic and political institutions is most desirable, not only in terms of general principles but in a more or less detailed form? A naturalistic ethics, if it is to be a genuine alternative to the traditional systems, cannot ignore this phase of morality. The suggestion is not to reinstate what Dewey rightly decries—the authoritative setting up of ideals for conduct prior to experience. What is being maintained is that certain large, desirable ends may be tentatively formulated and evaluated before dealing with specific situations. It is not enough to know how to do things; it is equally important to have some idea of what we want to do. The relatively concrete content of ideals must therefore become the concern of ethics. Of course, as Dewey maintains, the ideal ends should be plastic and progressively defined in terms of the conflicts and obstacles involved and of the means that are available.

Moreover, Dewey has not troubled himself to show the application of intelligence to a certain area of experience—the tragic, hopeless, insoluble predicaments of life. Dewey is so passionately concerned with the possible growth of human life that he has neglected to comment on the significance of resignation and equanimity. These, too, are the fruits of intelligence. Dewey's moral attitude is not unlike that expressed in Spinoza's famous saying: "A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is not a meditation upon death but upon life." It is true that the energy we have should be spent more for the enhancement of life than for the discipline of facing defeat; yet no philosophy of human conduct is complete until it acknowledges the darker aspects of life and indicates attitudes that are relevant to them.

The suggestions made here both as to the pragmatic preliminary enrichment of ideal content and of the constructive role of resignation or equanimity in a dominantly active life can be incorporated into the body of Dewey's ethics. The very fact that his ethics can thus be further developed is a sign of its intrinsic fertility.

In its fundamentals Dewey's ethical theory is one of the most vital and relevant philosophies of conduct in contemporary thought. Grounded in human experience and natural events, it is an ethics exhilaratingly free from extra-empirical or super-naturalistic dogmas. Insisting on the application of experimental method or creative intelligence, it is an ethics as much opposed to the policy of listless drifting as to every kind of harsh authoritarianism. Finally, it is an ethics that is not satisfied with what is barely good enough for human beings, but demands the richest possible experience of which they are capable.

THE VICTORIES OF THE IMAGINATION

by Irwin Edman

UP TO HIS seventieth year Dewey had written nothing directly or specifically on the subject of "esthetics." Those who had read him with care, however, knew from his essay on "Qualitative Thought," from more than hints in his early *How We Think*, from the whole central theme of realized individuality in *Democracy and Education*, that he had been alert to the esthetic implications of his leading ideas. Dewey, his readers knew, was concerned with thought as an instrument for the enrichment of life. No one knew better than he that the art actually experienced in creation or enjoyment was a paramount instance of such fulfillment.

It is curious that Dewey's concern for experience vitally and pervasively realized should so long have escaped even attentive students of his writings, not to speak of his unsympathetic and sometimes obtuse critics (the latter rendered obtuse by blinding traditional preconceptions of their own). But under the circumstances it is less curious than it seems. He for so long took for granted that texture and vividness of life were what counted that his hasty readers sometimes assumed that he was either unaware of such values or totally opposed to them. His critics wrote as if he celebrated method for method's sake, instrumentalities for the sake of their manipulation, as if in these consisted Dewey's conception of the good life. It required the publication of *Art as Experience* to spell out for a good many readers the lesson that, far from neglecting or ignoring the claims of art, art was the illustration *par excellence* for Dewey of the meaning of intelligence, morals, democracy, education and even, ultimately, of the nature of things.

There is one additional reason which must in all

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honesty be mentioned as to why Dewey's philosophy, curiously fertile in suggestion concerning the nature of art, has for long been regarded as without any, or at most with destructive, implications for the life and the imagination. His style is often awkward, lumbering and bleakly abstract. The tone of his prose, his forthrightness, sincerity and sometimes homespun eloquence do not quite suggest a philosopher who would, in *Art as Experience*, say that experience is only *completely* realized where it is imaginative and that experience is only purely and thoroughly realized in, or as, art. Yet despite these obstacles and long before Dewey's only explicit work on the subject, it should have been realized where Dewey's heart lay and where his mind pointed. What Dewey eventually was to say about art was implicit in all he previously had to say about experience. In the processes of artistic creation and of artistic enjoyment (the latter also, as he makes clear, is a process) experience becomes most patently what it always incipiently is. A work of art, in any of the arts, is the expressive movement of matter to a formed fulfillment. In art the organization of energies becomes a matter of direct perception. The whole of Dewey's philosophy of art is less an "esthetics" than a work on experience *in excelsis*—experience as it is when it is what it always is in possibility: rich, ordered and directly and immediately enjoyable.

Dewey, holding fast to the notion that experience is whole, not compartmentalized, throws important light on the question of expressiveness in the arts, not least in his explicit treatment of the relation of substance and form. Substance and form are, like sense and meaning, usually separated. There are artists and critics who have written as if each art exploited a pure and isolated sense, as if painting simply aroused and gratified the sense of seeing, as if music were only the fulfillment of a psychologically disconnected sense of hearing. Dewey is no less aware than the most puristic critic of the special quality of the medium in each art, what Pater called "the element of song in the singing." But he recognizes that the eye with which one sees is the eye of a human being, the ear with which one hears is the ear of a humanly involved awareness. "The eye, the ear, whatever, is only the channel *through* which the total response takes place. A color as seen is always qualified by implicit reactions of many organs, those of the sympathetic system as well as of touch. It is a fun-

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THE HERE AND THE NOW have always been the materials of John Dewey's philosophy. In shaping these, he has been guided by the observable laws of growth and evolution rather than set designs exhumed from the past or erratic leaps toward an imagined perfection. In his vision of cultivating in each individual a justified confidence in his own powers to cope with reality, he has offered democracy the tool best adapted to an age of emergency, common sense. This seems to me a warmer term than intelligence. It has a touch of emotion in it. It implies a neighborly exchange of solutions, as in a village. To cite a minor American classic, common sense is the Lady from Philadelphia in a world of Peterkins. To cite a more impressive classic, John Dewey is the Plato of our marketplace.

—Robert Hillyer

nel for the total energy put forth, not its wellspring. Colors are sumptuous and rich just because a total organic resonance is deeply implicated in them." (*Art as Experience*, p. 244.)

And not organic resonances only. One of the most suggestive features of Dewey's analysis is the way in which he expounds the part played by prior experience in shaping esthetic perception, in qualifying the characteristics of the sensuously here and now, in rendering truly expressive objects perceived by the senses. We see painting with the eye, hear music with the ear. But it is we, human beings with a past, who see and hear. "The quality of what is seen and heard varies with past experience. The scope of a work of art is measured by the number and variety of elements coming from past experience that are organically absorbed into the perceptions had here and now." The freshness of a work, the excitement, the reverberation of it in awareness is more than a merely sensory seizure; it is fusion of the past with the present. What we humanly bring to bear is sensuously embodied, and gives overtone, resonance and range to color, line, mass, volume, word, cadence, musical motif. Virgil's "tears of things" are our tears too.

The word imagination is a favorite though vague word in esthetic discussion. For Dewey the meaning is specific and his use of it throws light not only on art but philosophy. Imagination operates when there is that fusion through an object rendered acutely and coherently vivid to the senses, of the previously encountered and the presently perceived. This fusion, brought about by a work of art, itself a subtle set of internal relations, constitutes a *new* as well as a whole experience. Though the poet, the painter may give us "the light that never was on sea or land," it is a light related to light *on* sea or land. But now everything is bathed in a new luminosity, in an unprecedented intensity. These perceptions are ordered into a novel design of, in some sort, familiar materials; the perceptions are fresh and what is also fresh is the quality of the light thrown on already familiar experience, the quality that the past is made to confer upon apparently purely present colors and lines and patterns. In so far as spontaneity, freedom, novelty are possible in experience, they occur in this fusion of old and new. It is precisely the imaginative wedding of the present to the past in which creation consists. And in so far as science and philosophy are truly creative, they share this process with art; they, too, are victories of the imagination.

There is an ancient quarrel, says Plato, between poetry and philosophy. There is an almost equally ancient quarrel between those who insist that art is pure and those who insist that it is about something. But the issue is artificial, germane to the dialectics of analysis, not to the experience of art. The values of sense and form about which purist critics make so much ado come to the live creature in modulations due to his past history. Lines bound objects, or express time and space relationships, or they express human situations, intensify the familiar common properties of human interaction with the world. Volume, mass and light are seen as features and phases of our general experience. The rhythms of lines or tones are expressive of ordered tension, unfolding developments, familiar in life outside of art. Rhythms are the points of emphasis in a developing experience, rendered in art more perspicuous than usual. "Art is fine," Dewey puts it, "when it draws upon the material of other experiences, and expresses their materials in a medium which clarifies and intensifies its energy through the order which supervenes."

If one were to sum up Dewey's philosophy of art, one might, I think, put it thus: the arts are modes of experiencing, in which through the imaginative use of a medium, the organization of color, light, line, sound —all the resources of the arts—the liveness of the live creature is enlivened, and his liveness given a vital order through form. The arts are modes of energy which function as ways of communication. But the communication of art is something far different from conveying practical information or stating general and abstract ideas. Art communicates by celebrating the qualities of human experience. The special way in which art communicates is through the operation of imagination as Dewey conceives it. The arts present a new experience in each genuine (not merely academic and repetitive) instance. The freshness of art helps liberate men from the routines of habit, from conven-

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tional distinctions made for theoretical or practical reasons. By way of art, men are reborn into the experience from whose vitalities they have been cut off by artificial distinctions, by social rigidities and dogmas and by the sheer weight of a routine that banishes all qualities save those pertinent to the narrow business in hand.

Dewey's work is full of suggestions as to the particular arts and has hints that need development as to the ways in which the arts are varied emphases of the same human experience. But though Dewey's reflections on the arts are themselves aids to criticism and to the sharpening of perception in the arts, it may be said, I think not unjustly, that his chief contribution to esthetics is a philosophical one. That is to say, he has provided a fresh, empirical approach to the basic issues involved in understanding the arts, but he has shown, what is of even more importance, the implications of the experience of art for the enterprise of philosophy. Most theories of art are really exercises in epistemology: the arts are made in some degree cognitive and contemplative. Dewey, as I have tried to show, treats art simply as a fully realized experience; "it provides a unique control for the imaginative venture of philosophy."

Creative philosophical thinking is for Dewey a genuine adventure and an authentic exploration. It brin bear the accumulated experience of the past as a tool a liberating and fruitful use of the present. In traditional philosophy distinctions of matter and mind, subject and object, sense and reason, are made for special purposes in the context of a metaphysics formulated on experience dialectically conceived. If art as experience shows best what experience is, an adequate empirical philosophy must look at what goes on in response to art, where our interactions with our environment are not broken up and dislocated. In routine daily life, we only on occasion have experience pure, clear, ordered, alive, whole.

The problem of the *new* has plagued philosophers. What is it, is it really possible, and how? It is possible in art, and the mode of the work is the how of its possibility. In art the new and old are experienced in a fresh fusion as one. And a philosophy of experience, too, brings to bear its heritage upon its present. An adequate philosophy of experience is one that, like a work of art, sees life freshly and sees it whole. Dewey's philosophy began as a revolt against those systems of thought that alleged an intellectual Absolute as the really real. But there is an esthetic Absolute in Dewey: experience in its integrity. Mostly in art do we find instances of such integrity, means fused with ends, medium with meaning, part with whole. Art thus becomes a measure of success in civilization and in life and in wisdom. Art serves as a model of what society might approximate—ordered vitality, patterned energy and immediate delight. Dewey's philosophy of art is, in the deepest sense, the culmination of his moral philosophy. In art human beings achieve that intrinsic freedom which is the meaning, for Dewey, of democracy, a free society in which intelligence functions. Art is intelligibility become an immediate delight; it is freedom enjoyed.

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